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Estimates by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), and the World Bank concerning the welfare impact of the 2007/08 global food crisis conclude 
that between 75 million and 160 million people were thrown into hunger or poverty. However, these 
simulation-based approaches suffer from inherent deficiencies as well as insufficient coverage of the 
largest developing countries, especially China and India. This paper therefore assesses the usefulness of 
an alternative to simulation-based approaches, self-reported food insecurity data from the Gallup World 
Poll (GWP), a survey conducted before, during, and after the 2007/08 crisis. While these data are still less 
than ideal, we show that trends in self-reported food insecurity are statistically explained by both food 
inflation (positively) and economic growth (negatively). This validation motivates us to employ the GWP 
data as a barometer for the welfare impacts of the global food crisis. Our findings suggest that while there 
was tremendous variation in trends across countries, global self-reported food insecurity fell from 2005 to 
2008, with the most plausible lower- and upper-bound estimates ranging from 60 million to 250 million 
fewer food-insecure people over that period. These results are clearly driven by rapid economic growth 
and very limited food price inflation in the world’s most populous countries, particularly China and India. 
Hence, self-reported indicators of food insecurity reveal a trend opposite that of simulation-based 
approaches. 




The author particularly wishes to thank Angus Deaton for the introduction to the Gallup World Poll data 
used herein, as well as very detailed comments on an early draft. Thanks also to Gallup staff for 
answering a number of questions and to Shahla Shapouri of USDA for providing comments and 
answering questions regarding the USDA model. John Hoddinott, Olivier Ecker, Paul Dorosh, Bart 
Minten, Maggie McMillan, Maximo Torero, and Shenggen Fan also contributed useful comments and 
suggestions. The author also thanks USAID for financial support and Yetnayet Begashaw, Teferi 
Mequaninte, and Sangeetha Malaiyandi for excellent research assistance. Any errors are definitely my 
own.    
1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In approximate terms, the global food crisis of 2007/08 involved a doubling of international wheat and 
maize prices in the space of two years and a tripling of international rice prices in the space of just a few 
months. Such rapid increases in the international prices of staple foods understandably raised concern 
about impacts on the world’s poor. Surveys suggest that poor households spend at least half of their 
budget on food. If such a household does not earn income from producing or selling food, then a doubling 
of food prices would—all else equal—equate to at least a 25 percent loss of disposable income. And 
while that situation is most relevant to the urban poor—who by definition produce little or no food—a 
large body of evidence suggests that even the rural poor are often net consumers of food (World Bank 
2008c). Consistent with these stylized facts, many simulation exercises of the impact of higher food 
prices on poverty suggest that poverty often rises in both rural and urban areas (Arndt et al. 2008; Ivanic 
and Martin 2008b; Robles and Torero 2010; Warr 2008; Zezza et al. 2008). The earliest such exercise was 
used by the World Bank to estimate that as many as 100 million were thrown into poverty (World Bank 
2008a). A subsequent 73-country World Bank study estimated that global poverty rose by around 160 
million people, 90 million of whom were rural (de Hoyos and Medvedev 2009). The U.N. Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO 2009) and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA 2009)—using a rather 
different methodology and the concept of calorie insufficiency rather than poverty—estimated that around 
75–80 million people were thrown into hunger during the 2008 food crisis and another 97 million during 
the 2009 financial crisis. Another World Bank study, using an FAO-type methodology, also estimated 
that 63 million people were thrown into hunger by the two crises (Tiwari and Zaman 2010). 
Despite an apparent consensus among international organizations that rising food prices are bad 
for the world’s poor, that conclusion has been challenged by other academics. Some criticisms are 
conceptual while others focus on deficiencies in data and methods. Conceptually, Swinnen (2010) 
emphasized that whenever a price changes, some benefit and some lose. Whether the poor are likely to 
benefit or lose depends largely on their occupational status (whether they get their income from 
agriculture or nonagriculture) but also on the depth of their poverty (their total household budget and the 
proportion of that budget that they must devote to food expenditures). While the poor by definition have 
lower household budgets and large food expenditure shares, it is also well documented that around three-
fifths of the world’s poor primarily work in agriculture, with another one-fifth working in rural nonfarm 
sectors often dependent on agriculture (World Bank 2008c). So if rising agricultural prices also lead to 
rises in farm and nonfarm wages and income, then the net impacts might be positive. Aksoy and Isik-
Dikmelik (2008) also demonstrated that even when the rural poor are net food consumers, they are often 
only marginally so. Hence one could be forgiven for believing that higher food prices involve a 
redistribution of income from richer urban areas to poorer rural areas. Indeed, as Rodrik noted early on in 
the crisis,
1 pre-crisis trade liberalization studies suggested that higher agricultural prices (food and 
nonfood) would reduce poverty in the developing world. 
With regard to empirics, the World Bank, USDA, and FAO poverty and hunger estimates have 
also been questioned. While we provide more details of these criticisms in Section 2, there is a laundry 
list of potential problems. The widely cited FAO numbers—that 75 million were thrown into hunger 
during the crisis—are in fact based on USDA estimates because the FAO’s “food availability” model has 
no capacity to model the impact of “food access” shocks (price changes). The USDA models access 
shocks based on trade channels but incorporate very little data on domestic price changes. This “global” 
model also excludes a number of large middle-income countries, including China, Brazil, and Mexico. 
More sophisticated simulations based on the approach pioneered by Deaton (1989) are better at 
conceptualizing and measuring the vulnerability of households to higher food prices (that is, whether they 
are net food producers or net food consumers), but these simulations have other weaknesses. More often 
                                                       




than not the shock to the model is an assumed price increase rather than an observed one, and the shock 
pertains only to food prices rather than other prices that were also increasing over 2005–2008, such as 
fuel and nonfood commodities (Headey and Fan 2008). The models are almost invariably partial 
equilibrium at best, and at least one general equilibrium model (for India) indirectly suggests that rising 
food prices could raise unskilled wages, which benefits the poor (Polaski et al. 2008). This claim is 
generally supported by existing econometric studies that test the impact of price movements on 
agricultural wages (Lasco et al., 2008). And finally, like the USDA model, simulation-based approaches 
invariably exclude fast-growing China and mostly omit other large countries like India, Indonesia, and 
Brazil. 
Another key feature of all types of simulations is that they incorporate very little real-time data 
from the food crisis period, be it food prices, national income trends, or household survey data. In this 
paper we therefore propose an alternative assessment of global trends in food insecurity based on Gallup 
World Poll (GWP) survey data collected before, during, and after the 2007/08 food crisis in well over 100 
countries. These surveys are at least superficially well suited to assessing global food security trends for 
several reasons. First, the GWP has been conducted from 2005/06—before the global food crisis—to 
2010 in well over 100 countries, including the most populous developing countries. Second, the vast 
majority of GWP surveys contain two questions that capture different dimensions of food security. One 
question relates to whether the household has had any problems affording food over the last 12 months, 
while the second asks whether the household has experienced episodes of hunger in the last 12 months. 
Third, Deaton (2010) has shown that the GWP indicator of food insecurity is closely correlated with gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita and other welfare measures. And fourth, these surveys were conducted 
in the space of a month, with the month in question recorded. The significance of this last point is that we 
can match changes in self-reported food insecurity to monthly food inflation data and—more 
approximately—to annual data on economic growth. Hence we can test whether changes in self-reported 
food insecurity are explained by changes in mean income and food inflation, and thereby provide some 
validation for trends in these data. 
While these characteristics suggest that the GWP data may provide a suitable means of assessing 
trends in global food security during the food and financial crises, there are obviously caveats. First, our 
research question is conceptually different from those posed in simulation analyses. The latter generally 
try to gauge the impact of rising food prices, all else equal. In the real world, however, all else was not 
equal: Oil and nonfood commodity prices were also rising, often to the benefit of developing countries, 
and nearly all poor countries experienced rapid economic growth over 2005–2008, especially the largest, 
such as China and India. Moreover, the rise in food prices was not causally independent from strong 
economic growth and fuel inflation. The weak U.S. dollar, the impacts of oil prices on biofuels demand, 
and strong economic growth in developing countries are all factors related to both economic growth and 
food inflation. This suggests that simulation studies typically impose unrealistic scenarios on their 
models. 
A second caveat is that there are well-known flaws in self-reported indicators, including possible 
biases, as well as problems specific to the GWP. Hence, much of our paper is devoted to detailing the 
specific characteristics of the GWP surveys and the two measures involved (Section 3), and to exploring 
the plausibility of both cross-country patterns (Section 4) and within-country trends in the data (Section 
5). A key finding is that while levels of self-reported food insecurity may be biased—especially when 
comparing richer countries with poorer countries—changes in self-reported food insecurity are very 
desirably explained by economic growth (positively) and inflation (negatively), especially in low-income 
countries. 
Taking this last finding as at least a partial validation of trends in self-reported food insecurity, 
Section 6 goes on to estimate global and regional food insecurity trends, while Section 7 conducts some 
critically important sensitivity analyses. Our findings are spectacular for the degree to which they differ 
from simulation-based estimates. In contrast to the various USDA, FAO, and World Bank global 
simulation estimates, we find that global self-reported food insecurity went down from 2005/06 to 
2007/08, not up. Moreover, most of our estimates suggest that it went down by a huge margin. Our upper- 
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bound estimate puts the decrease at about 340 million people, while our lower bound puts the decrease at 
about 60 million. It is also quite transparent what explains this trend: very rapid economic growth and 
very modest inflation in China, India, and other large developing countries. 
Section 8 concludes with a reiteration of the caveats of this self-reported indicator as well as some 
other words of caution and some lessons learned. Two important lessons are that economic growth 
appears to have been a major driver of trends in food insecurity and that focusing on the largest countries 
is obviously essential for any plausible estimate of global food insecurity. A final word of caution pertains 
to the fact that the impacts of the 2007/08 crisis are not necessarily a good guide to the current (2010/11) 
crisis. The pattern of food inflation this time around may be quite different, with inflation in China, India, 
and other large countries currently much higher than it was in 2008. 
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2.  A BRIEF REVIEW OF EXISTING ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACTS OF THE  
FOOD AND FINANCIAL CRISES 
Since self-reported indicators of welfare inevitably have flaws (see Section 3 below), the question is not 
whether our approach is imperfect but whether it is more or less imperfect than alternative approaches. 
Hence, this section provides a review of the chief criticisms of simulation-based approaches to measuring 
global food insecurity (hunger or poverty). The two basic approaches are the FAO/USDA and Tiwari and 
Zaman (2010) hunger estimates (largely based on national-level food availability data), and poverty 
estimates conducted by World Bank staff and their collaborators (largely based on Living Standards 
Measurement Study surveys). 
Beginning with the former approach, the FAO uses minimum energy requirements as a “hunger 
line” and then estimates the proportion of people falling below that line based on estimates of the total 
number of available calories in the country and a lognormal distribution of calories estimated from 
income data from household surveys. It would be fair to say that all three components of this method 
suffer from serious measurement problems, a fact that FAO statisticians and others are clearly aware of 
(FAO 2002; Svedberg 2000). Specifically, sensitivity analyses have shown that while the FAO method is 
not very sensitive to the lognormal distributional parameters, it is highly sensitive to the hunger line 
chosen and the estimate of mean calorie consumption (FAO 2002). With regard to the hunger line, 
minimum energy requirements vary with physical activity levels, which are entirely unobserved. In a 
nontrivial example, the one billion plus people of India, Deaton and Dreze (2008) persuasively argued 
that this fast-growing economy’s declining calorie consumption may be partly explained by declining 
calorie requirements associated with less physical labor. 
With regard to measurement of food availability the problem is perhaps even worse. The FAO 
measures of calorie availability are derived from estimates of food production, net imports, wastage, and 
storage, but none of these components are measured accurately in developing countries. Again in the 
Indian context, Headey, Chiu, and Kadiyala (2010) showed that while national survey sources indicate 
declining calorie consumption, the FAO data suggest increasing calorie availability. In African countries 
measurement errors are probably even worse. Smith, Alderman, and Aduayom (2006) rigorously 
compared FAO-based estimates of hunger to household survey–based estimates in 12 African countries. 
The mean percentage point difference between the two prevalence series was an extraordinary 32 points. 
The source of this divergence could be errors in both the FAO balance sheets and the household surveys, 
but in poorer countries there are good reasons to think that the FAO balance sheets contain the greater 
error because they estimate consumption by very indirect means and rely heavily on data inputs from 
capacity-constrained national statistical agencies. Moreover, the balance sheets estimate only the 
availability for consumption, not the actual consumption.
2 One prominent critique has gone so far as to 
conclude that “the FAO method is not reliable enough to provide policy-relevant estimates of the 
prevalence of malnutrition, even at the broad regional level” (Svedberg 2000, 300). 
But if there are such substantial errors in levels, there is even less reason to think that short-run 
shocks—like international price surges—could be adequately captured by the FAO methodology.
3 For 
example, unlike detailed country studies, the FAO data did not show any increase in hunger during the 
1997/98 Asian financial crisis because its estimates were driven by food availability rather than access 
(FAO 2002). Without a food access component to the model, how then was the FAO able to estimate the 
hunger impacts of rising food prices in 2007 and 2008? In fact, the FAO model was incapable of 
producing any credible estimates, so the FAO simply borrowed USDA (2008, 2009) estimates of the 
                                                       
2 That said, the Smith, Alderman, and Aduayom (2006) estimates have also been questioned. In a recent paper, Ecker and 
Qaim (2010) uncovered a much lower estimate of food insecurity in Malawi, suggesting that Smith, Alderman, and Aduayom’s 
estimates could be influenced by measurement error. 
3 The 2002 FAO symposium on the measurement of hunger and food security (FAO 2002) provided a long list of concerns 
about these data.  
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percent change in “global” hunger in 2007 and 2008/09, and applied these changes to its own pre-crisis 
dataset. Strictly speaking, then, there are no FAO estimates of the impacts of the food and financial crises. 
How, then, did USDA estimate the impacts of these crises? The USDA (2008) hunger indicator is 
conceptually similar to the FAO model,
4 but it uses a more sophisticated structural model to derive 
hunger estimates. Specifically, USDA uses calorie–income elasticities based on cross-country data on per 
capita calorie availability (as per the FAO) and per capita income, along with income distribution data 
from the World Bank. It then incorporates these elasticities into a partial equilibrium global trade and 
production model that includes elements like a food demand function. However, the model is still weak 
on the food access dimension, with no incorporation of domestic food inflation, for example. Moreover, 
as the authors of the report note, if countries draw down on stocks or receive more food aid, then the 
model may underestimate food availability (USDA 2008). Also critical is the fact that the USDA model 
pertains only to 70 low-income countries and thus excludes some huge middle-income countries, 
including China, Brazil, and Mexico. This would appear to explain why FAO applied the proportional 
change in the “global” USDA hunger figures rather than the country-level changes. 
As for the financial crisis impacts, USDA based these on International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
projections from February 2009 on lost growth in export earnings and capital inflows for 2009. A “lost 
exports” scenario puts the increase in hunger at 63 million people, while the “lost exports plus lost capital 
flow” model puts it at 97 million. Such a large number is mainly driven by the fact that early IMF 
estimates projected that Asian countries would suffer most from lost export earnings and capital inflows 
because their baseline growth in these indicators was so strong. So Asia accounts for about half of the 97 
million additional hungry people, for example. This surge in Asian hunger comes despite the fact that the 
region has continued to have spectacular economic growth rates during the financial crisis. It also seems 
implausible that slower trade growth would hurt food availability so severely in Asia. Among the larger 
East Asian countries, only the Philippines is a consistently large grain importer (Bangladesh is 
occasionally so); the rest of Asia is largely self-sufficient in staple grains, especially rice. Indeed, updated 
USDA (2011) estimates of food consumption for 2007/08 and 2008/09 show that, relative to 2005/06, 
food consumption was at the same level or higher in all Asian regions, with only a very slight -0.7 percent 
decline in rice consumption in East Asia (Table 2.1). 
A variation of the USDA and FAO approaches was developed in a World Bank research paper by 
Tiwari and Zaman (2010). These authors estimated a cross-country Engel curve in order to quantify the 
amount of income required to purchase the calorie requirement, estimated cumulative density functions 
for income, and then assumed an own-price calorie elasticity of -0.5. They then shocked the model with a 
food price shock and an economic growth shock. The food price shock was an assumed food price 
increase (for example, 25 percent) rather than an observed one, which influenced calorie availability 
through the own-price elasticity. The financial crisis shock was the difference between pre–financial crisis 
forecast growth rates and post–financial crisis forecast growth rates, although we again note that it has 
subsequently turned out that developing countries were mostly not hard hit by the financial crisis, 
especially China and India (IMF 2010). So once again, the model and the shocks to the model were very 
simplistic. Moreover, the food price effect almost entirely hinged on the assumed own-price calorie 
elasticity of -0.5, a figure applied to the global dataset but based on estimates from only three developing 
countries. 
We think a fair assessment of these hunger models is that they are far too crude to reliably predict 
the impact of access shocks, such as a rise in international food prices.
5 The results for all three models 
                                                       
4 The FAO and USDA approaches to hunger measurement do have differences. FAO uses a minimum requirement of 1800 
calories while USDA uses 2100 calories. FAO uses the estimate of per capita calorie consumption of a country as its mean, while 
consumption–income variance is estimated based on household survey data; it assumes the consumption–income relationship to 
be lognormal. And while FAO uses the number of calories as a unit of measurement, USDA’s Economic Research Service (ERS) 
converts the calories to kilograms of grain equivalent. See www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/GlobalFoodSecurity/questions.htm for 
more details. 
 
5 Of the three hunger models, the USDA model is certainly the most sophisticated. It is also important to note two other  
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also seem to contradict USDA data on consumption trends, reported in Table 2.1. These data show that 
cereal availability for food consumption did not decline substantially in any Asian region. Moreover, 
while consumption of wheat appears to have declined in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2007/08, maize and rice 
consumption actually increased by around 5 percent in each case. Overall, then, Table 2.1 does not 
suggest that there was a major food availability shock in any populous region. This does not rule out the 
importance of access shock, of course, but this is not really a channel that these models are exploring. 
Table 2.1—Availability of major cereals in 2007/08 and 2008/09 relative to 2005/06 (% change) 
Region  Maize  Wheat  Rice  Any major 
declines?    2007/08  2008/09  2007/08  2008/09  2007/08  2008/09 
Caribbean  1.1%  0.9%  7.7%  1.4%  10.0%  3.6%  no 
Central America  13.4%  13.4%  -3.0%  -3.3%  3.3%  5.2%  wheat only 
South America  4.8%  9.6%  2.3%  2.7%  0.6%  4.6%  no 
East Asia  16.3%  18.5%  -0.1%  -0.5%  -0.7%  3.6%  no 
South Asia  -4.7%  10.8%  9.6%  4.8%  6.6%  8.0%  maize only 
Southeast Asia  12.5%  20.8%  3.6%  4.5%  5.1%  4.5%  no 
Sub-Saharan Africa  5.0%  16.3%  -11.0%  3.8%  5.2%  10.5%  wheat only 
North Africa  15.0%  30.0%  6.0%  9.7%  1.7%  15.6%  no 
Middle East  9.2%  9.2%  1.4%  3.4%  -1.1%  2.7%  no 
Former USSR  5.7%  11.7%  -0.4%  0.1%  -2.4%  -6.7%  rice only 
Other Europe  -4.1%  -4.1%  -4.6%  -5.5%  16.2%  6.8%  maize & wheat 
European Union  -10.3%  0.7%  -0.7%  3.0%  20.1%  10.3%  maize only 
North America*  40.0%  56.4%  1.9%  1.1%  4.5%  5.5%  no 
Source: USDA (2011). 
Notes: Data generally run from July in year t to June in year t + 1. Note that all data are aggregate. *In the case of maize and 
wheat we have used nonfeed consumption data, which includes industrial uses such as biofuels. This explains the sharp increase 
in North American maize consumption. 
Are simulation techniques based on the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) any 
better? A number of studies followed Deaton (1989) in estimating changes in household disposable 
income as a function of whether a household is a net consumer or net producer of food. Ivanic and Martin 
(2008a, b) conducted such an analysis for 9 developing countries, and Zezza and colleagues (2008) for 11 
countries, while Dessus, Herrera, and de Hoyos (2008) and de Hoyos and Medvedev (2009) conducted an 
analysis for 73 developing countries. While the two 73-country studies are certainly quite comprehensive, 
the former covered only urban areas, while the latter’s coverage of rural areas was based on an imputation 
of rural nonfarm income shares—which is essential to measuring net food consumption versus 
production—from just 19 of the 73 countries. Moreover, the 73-country dataset still excluded China (25 
percent of the developing world’s population), so coverage was still not truly global. 
Are there other problems with LSMS-based simulations? In truth, many of the studies cited above 
were rigorous and sophisticated analyses, so the criticisms below often apply more to the nature of the 
simulations rather than the quality of the work per se. Bearing that in mind, Headey and Fan (2008, 2010) 
reviewed a number of these models and pointed to some important limitations. First, they expressed some 
skepticism that higher food prices seemed so often to raise rural poverty in these simulations. For 
example, it is well documented that many rural households engage in both farm and nonfarm activities 
(Winters et al. 2008), suggesting that rural people could conceivably be able to quickly switch their labor 
efforts as the terms of trade for agriculture change.
6 Moreover, many rural nonfarm activities relate 
                                                                                                                                                                           
features of the USDA model. First, in our view its estimates should be considered upper bound because countries can respond to 
higher international food prices by altering their trade policies (for example, reducing tariffs) or by releasing stocks. Hence many 
countries may not import international food inflation as the model suggests. Second, USDA conducted its model relatively early 
on when the full impacts of the financial crisis in developing countries were estimated by the IMF to be quite dire. Re-estimating 
the USDA model with more recent data could well show more muted impacts on hunger. 
6 The study by de Hoyos and Medvedev (2009) also relied on estimates of the size of the rural nonfarm economy in the 
majority of its 73-country sample.  
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directly to the processing, transporting, or sale of food, and there is a large literature showing strong 
effects of farm-based economic growth on rural nonfarm incomes (Haggblade, Hazell, and Reardon 
2007). This suggests that first-round effects on farm incomes, even if accrued to the nonpoor, could have 
beneficial spillover effects on farm and nonfarm wages, which could well accrue to the poor.
7 In a 
computable general equilibrium model for India, for example, Polaski et al. (2008) showed that higher 
rice prices reduced overall poverty because they raised unskilled wages in both rural and urban areas. 
However, the majority of partial equilibrium simulation approaches do not incorporate these more indirect 
causal pathways.
8 
Second, most of the LSMS-based simulation exercises incorporate price shocks that are an 
assumed proportion of international price increases rather the actual price increases observed in domestic 
markets (the study by de Hoyos and Medvedev [2009] is an important exception since it used domestic 
food inflation relative to nonfood inflation). However, Headey and Fan (2008)—and others—documented 
large variation in domestic food inflation across countries. Transmission of international prices was quite 
high in Africa and parts of Latin America, but much lower in several of the most populous Asian 
countries, such as China, India, and Indonesia (Dawe 2008).
9 Moreover, these large Asian countries were 
under-studied in this literature, and the only detailed analyses of large developing countries—Polaski and 
colleagues (2008) for India and Ivanic and Martin (2008a, b) for Vietnam—suggested that higher food 
prices would actually benefit the poor. There are no detailed studies of China, but considering that rural 
incomes are much lower than urban incomes in China, it seems perfectly plausible that a rise in food 
prices would reduce poverty in the world’s most populous country. 
Finally, virtually all of these simulation exercises asked a very specific question of their models: 
“What would happen to poverty if food prices went up, and only food prices went up?” However, this 
ceteris paribus assumption definitely does not apply to the period 2005–2008. On the negative side, fuel 
prices were also increasing rapidly, which constituted a secondary source of inflation that may have hurt 
the poor quite considerably (Arndt et al. 2008; Passa Orio and Wodon 2008). But on the plus side, the 
period before and during the crisis comprised several years of rapid economic growth in the vast majority 
of developing countries. Moreover, rapid economic growth was often cited as an underlying cause of the 
food crisis, so economic growth and food inflation have not been mutually exclusive phenomena in recent 
years. This economic growth was also very widespread. It included net exporters of nonfood 
commodities, such as oil, minerals, and cash crops, but also included the most populous developing 
countries. The economies of China, India, Brazil, Nigeria, and Ethiopia—to name just a few—were all 
growing at 6–10 percent per year in the “crisis” years as well as those preceding them. Moreover, the 
early IMF forecasts of the impact of the financial crisis on developing countries turn out to have 
overestimated the slowdown in economic growth among developing countries in 2009 and 2010. So it is 
certainly plausible that this strong economic growth in the developing countries—especially the most 
populous—was both rapid enough and pro-poor enough to overturn any adverse impact of rising food 
prices. On this basis it should not be surprising if Gallup World Poll data from 2005 to 2008 show results 
that are different from those of the LSMS-based simulations, because the GWP presumably captured the 
effects of income growth as well as actual domestic price changes. Even so, this claim needs to be 
formally established, as do other strengths and weaknesses of the GWP data. 
                                                       
7 Ivanic and Martin (2008a, b) partly allowed for some wage effects through a partial equilibrium adjustment. 
8 Headey and Fan (2010) also suggested that household surveys may overestimate net food consumption given recall biases. 
For example, sometimes production and consumption questions cover different recall periods. This creates the potential for a bias 
rather than just random error. For example, longer recall periods of production could lead to underreporting of food production, 
while a shorter recall period for consumption could fail to pick up food received in kind. Recent work by Beegle and De Weerdt 
(2010) found that the method of estimating food consumption has significant impacts on estimates, suggesting that estimation of 
net food consumers versus producers could indeed be biased by differences in the consumption and production modules of 
household surveys. 
9 This observation is consistent with more specific studies on price transmission. For example, Minot (2010) showed that 
price transmission was high in 12 African economies, and Robles and Torero (2010) found significant transmission in several 
Latin-American countries. However, Dawe (2008) found much lower rates of transmission in Asian countries, which typically 
protect their markets for international prices.  
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3.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE GALLUP WORLD POLL SURVEYS AND THEIR 
SPECIFIC INDICATORS OF FOOD SECURITY 
In this section we aim to provide an overview of the Gallup World Poll and of the specific food security 
indicators that it collects. Since GWP is conducted by a private organization and its collaborators, our 
analysis of the reliability and accuracy of the data is limited to external observations, and we rely on 
Gallup materials for many of the factual details that follow.
10 
Since 2005/06 the Gallup World Poll has interviewed households in about 150 countries, 
although not always on an annual basis. Surveys are translated from English, French, or Spanish into the 
required local languages. Most questions are constructed to have yes or no answers so as to minimize 
translation errors. In developing countries all but one of the GWP surveys are face-to-face (China 2009 
being the exception) and most take around one hour. 
Surveys follow a complex design with probability-based samples intended to be nationally 
representative of the entire resident civilian noninstitutionalized population, aged 15 and older. In the first 
stage of sampling, primary sampling units (PSUs), consisting of clusters of households, are stratified by 
population size, geography, or both, with clustering achieved through one or more stages of sampling. 
Where population information is available, sample selection is based on probabilities proportional to 
population size; otherwise simple random sampling is used. Gallup typically surveys 1,000 individuals in 
each country except in larger countries such as India (roughly 6,000), China (4,000), and Russia (3,000). 
In the second stage, random route procedures are used to select sampled households within a 
PSU. Unless an outright refusal occurs, interviewers make up to three attempts to survey the sampled 
household at different times of the day and on different days (if possible). If an interview cannot be 
obtained at the initial sampled household, a simple substitution method is used. Third-stage respondents 
are randomly selected within the selected households. Interviewers list all eligible household members 
and their ages or birth dates. The respondent is selected by means of the Kish grid, and the person who 
answers the door is not informed of the selection criteria until after the respondent has been identified. In 
a few Middle Eastern and Asian countries where cultural restrictions dictate gender matching, 
respondents are randomly selected using the Kish grid from among all eligible adults. 
In addition to the sampling, the post-survey treatment of data is also an important consideration in 
assessing the GWP. Gallup’s directors of survey research in each region of the world review the data for 
consistency and stability by interviewer and region. If the regional director suspects a problem, he or she 
can ask for new data to be collected. After review by the regional directors, Gallup scientists perform 
additional validity reviews. The data are centrally aggregated and cleaned, ensuring correct variable codes 
and labels are applied. The data are then reviewed in detail for logical consistency and trends over time. 
Once the data are cleaned, weighted, and vetted, the final step is to calculate approximate study design 
effect and margin of error. Data weighting is used to ensure a nationally representative sample for each 
country and is intended to be used for calculations within a country. First, base sampling weights are 
constructed to account for oversamples and household size. If an oversample has been conducted, the data 
are weighted to correct the disproportionate sample. Weighting by household size (number of residents 
aged 15 and older) is used to adjust for the probability of selection, since residents in large households 
will have a disproportionately lower probability of being selected for the sample. However, weighting by 
household size was introduced only in 2008. Second, post-stratification weights are constructed. 
Population statistics are used to weight the data by gender, age, and where reliable data are available, 
education or socioeconomic status. Finally, approximate study design effect and margin of error are 
calculated to reflect the influence of data weighting (see Gallup 2010b for more details as well as 
Appendix C for a list of estimated margins of error by survey). 
Margins of error are generally in the 3–4 percent range at the 95 percent confidence level, with a 
mean error margin of 3.3 percent. This means that if the survey was conducted 100 times using the exact 
                                                       
10 Much of what follows is drawn directly from the Gallup Worldwide Research Methodology (Gallup 2010a).  
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same procedures, the “true value” around a reported percentage of 50 would fall within the range of 46.7 
percent to 53.3 percent in 95 out of 100 cases. Note, however, that because these surveys are a clustered 
sample design, the margin of error varies by question, so it is possible that the margin of error is greater 
for certain questions, including the two analyzed herein (more on this below). We also note that the 
margin of error in China and India tends to be lower than the average (1.6 to 2.6 percentage points). This 
is because the law of large numbers ensures that general measurement errors are relatively low (see 
below). 
Another point of note is that in the vast majority of cases Gallup does not report any sampling 
errors, but in a handful of cases it finds that certain sections of the population are oversampled (see 
Appendix C). For example, urban areas were oversampled in Pakistan, Russia, and Ukraine in at least one 
year, and in the August–September 2009 survey in China the provinces of Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Guangzhou were oversampled, possibly because of a switch to telephone surveying. In other contexts it 
appears that Gallup oversampled more educated groups (Senegal, Zambia), and in some developing 
countries certain parts of the country were not sampled at all because of ongoing political instability or 
other accessibility problems. This includes northeastern India, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), northern Uganda, northwest Pakistan, eastern Chad, and northern Sri Lanka. In all cases except 
eastern Chad, these areas represent less than 10 percent of the country’s population, and more often less 
than 5 percent. 
While these general characteristics of the GWP surveys are pertinent, we now turn to the specific 
questions of interest. The exact phrasing of the two questions on food security is as follows: 
1.  “Have there been times in the past 12 months when you did not have enough money to buy 
the food that you or your family needed?” A simple yes or no answer is recorded. For 
shorthand we refer to this as the “food insecurity” indicator, rather than a more cumbersome 
term such as “food unaffordability.” 
2.  “Have there been times in the past 12 months when you or your family have gone hungry?” 
Again, a simple yes or no answer is recorded. For shorthand we refer to this as the “hunger” 
indicator. 
It is worth dwelling on some characteristics of the exact phrasing of these questions for a 
moment, and on some potential question-specific problems. First, both questions very much pertain to 
concepts of food access rather than availability or production. Hence, conceptually at least, they are well 
suited to picking up the effects of a food price shock or another shock to disposable income such as 
economic growth. 
Second, both questions ask about both the individual and the family as a whole. This seems 
important given the well-documented possibility of biases in the intrahousehold distribution of food, 
particularly against females (Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 1996). It suggests, for example, that a 
mother who is sacrificing her own food intake for her children and husband still ought to answer yes to 
question 2. Moreover, the GWP sampling design seems to take account of possible gender biases in 
answers to this question, although a perusal of gender-disaggregated food insecurity prevalence rates 
suggests relatively small differences in answers between men and women.
11 
A third aspect of these two questions is the 12-month recall period. Since the month of the survey 
is recorded, we can match the survey responses to monthly inflation data, such as average inflation over 
the last 12 months, or even the maximum inflation rate over the previous 12 months (see Section 5 
below). However, one might also be skeptical about whether most respondents could accurately recall a 
12-month period. 
Fourth, while it is possible that hunger has an almost universal definition, food certainly does not. 
For a well-off and well-educated family accustomed to a high-quality diet, food may mean a food bundle 
                                                       
11 Even in wealthy countries it is well documented that husbands and wives provide different responses to these kinds of 
affordability questions. For example, a husband who is only responsible for the mortgage might claim that the family is not 
struggling with the mortgage or food, while a wife who is responsible for food purchases might claim that they are not struggling 
with the mortgage because of sacrifices on food items.  
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of sufficiently high quality (meat, eggs, dairy, and so on). For a very poor family, however, food may just 
mean enough cereals or other staple foods. Hence it is possible that the food insecurity measure is biased 
upward by education or income, or downward by overly low standards of food intake. This issue is taken 
up in the next section, where we explore whether cross-country patterns in the levels of these variables 
make sense.
12 
Fifth, the question about food affordability may be influenced by the ordering of questions within 
the survey, although Gallup does not provide systematic details on the ordering of questions. However, 
for China we do know that in the first GWP survey in 2006 the question of food affordability was placed 
immediately after a quite detailed income question.
13 This may have made respondents more likely to 
negatively assess their own food insecurity in that round (due to priming). Although this is only a 
conjecture, we will see below that food insecurity fell very sharply in China from 2006 to 2008, perhaps 
suggesting that food insecurity was indeed overestimated in 2006. Since China is the largest country in 
the world, concerns over self-reported food insecurity trends in China move us to consider a range of 
sensitivity analyses in Section 7. 
Sixth, in our data there is no disaggregation of rural and urban respondents. Moreover, there is no 
distinction in the GWP survey between net food producers and net food consumers, which is a weakness 
relative to the LSMS-type surveys reviewed in the previous section. For example, one concern might be 
that a smallholder who buys only 20 percent of his household food from the market may likely answer 
yes to the food access question if prices are high, even though the impact on his total disposable income is 
very small. 
Finally, any self-reported indicator can suffer from other problems. In authoritarian regimes there 
is the possibility that respondents are afraid to answer politically sensitive questions in an honest fashion. 
Similarly, media coverage of food price inflation could bias answers to this question. In some cultures 
there may also be cultural norms against admitting poverty, while in other countries people may over-
report food insecurity if poverty is a qualifier for social safety nets. A more specific issue relevant to the 
food access question is how farmers interpret the question. 
For these reasons economists have traditionally been wary of self-reported indicators of welfare 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001), although that trend has reversed in recent decades. Comparisons of 
self-reported poverty and more objectively defined indicators of poverty have uncovered very close 
relationships between the two (Pradhan and Ravallion 2000). And there is now, of course, an immense 
economic literature using indicators of self-reported well-being and health (Benitez-Silva et al. 2004; 
Headey, Muffels, and Wagner 2010), including indicators from the Gallup World Poll (Kahneman and 
Deaton 2010). Even so, there is no existing literature that explores the validity of these specific GWP 
measures, so the next two sections explore both cross-country patterns and time series trends in these two 
indicators. In our conclusion we also stress the need to do more extensive testing of these measures, 
including measuring test–retest reliability, and more exploration of how different people define food and 
food insecurity (for example, farmers and nonfarmers, rural and urban people, educated and uneducated 
people). 
                                                       
12 Phrasing has been found to be an important source of measurement error in these types of questions (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2001). 
13 We thank Angus Deaton for this information. Deaton also noted that he found the order of questions to be an issue in 
other questions in the GWP.  
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4.  DO CROSS-COUNTRY PATTERNS OF THE SELF-REPORTED INDICATORS 
MAKE SENSE? 
The goal of this section is to gauge whether the cross-country pattern of the two GWP indicators is in line 
with prior expectations. To that end we look at some basic descriptive statistics, including those 
concerning region, as well as some comparisons with indicators of poverty and food insecurity from other 
sources. We refrain from using the term “validation” to describe these comparisons because alternative 
indicators are also flawed, as discussed above and elsewhere (Deaton 2010). Moreover, it should also be 
pointed out that errors in levels do not necessarily translate to errors in differences, which are examined in 
the next section. 
To see if cross-country patterns in the two GWP indicators broadly make sense, Table 4.1 reports 
basic descriptive statistics while Table 4.2 reports regional means. From Table 4.1 we observe that the 
mean prevalence of households reporting problems with affording food is almost 32 percent, but mean 
levels of self-reported hunger are just 17 percent. Clearly this suggests that these two questions pertain to 
different concepts, as might be expected. Also of note is that both measures reach as high as 80 percent, 
and that the standard deviation is unsurprisingly quite large for both measures (20 points). Consistent with 
expectations, Table 4.2 shows that food insecurity and hunger are easily the highest in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, which is by far the poorest region in the world. However, food insecurity in South Asia is 
surprisingly low (31.2 percent) compared with East Asia and Latin America (34–36 percent). This pattern 
is particularly surprising given that anthropometric indicators of malnutrition are much higher in South 
Asia than in East Asia or Latin America, although malnutrition is certainly influenced by factors other 
than food security (such as healthcare, education, and gender inequality). Part of the divergence from 
expectation also relates to outliers and the small size of subsamples. For example, self-reported food 
insecurity in Cambodia is unusually high (67 percent), but in Nepal it is extremely low (9 percent). 
Population-weighted means also result in levels that are about equal in South and East Asia (33–34 
percent). 
Table 4.1—Basic descriptive statistics for the two GWP measures, various years 2005–2010 
  Food insecurity  Hunger 
 Unweighted mean  31.7  17.0 
 Median  27.0  9.0 
 Maximum  81.0  80.0 
 Minimum  1.0  1.0 
 Std. dev.  20.2  18.8 
 Observations  433  340 
Source: Data are from the Gallup World Poll (Gallup 2011).  
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Table 4.2—Regional unweighted means for the two GWP measures, circa 2005 
  Food insecurity  Hunger 
  Mean  # Obs  Mean  # Obs 
Sub-Saharan Africa*  58.3  27  54.2  29 
South Asia*  31.2  5  18.3  6 
East Asia*  34.0  7  14.4  7 
Middle East & North Africa*  26.5  2  18.0  3 
Central America & Caribbean*  34.7  9  23.1  12 
South America*  36.0  10  20.6  10 
Transition
a countries  29.1  23  8.1  23 
OECD
b  8.3  22  2.8  23 
Low income
c  48.6  49  37.4  55 
Middle income
c  29.6  28  14.1  31 
Upper income
c  11.0  34  3.4  34 
Source: Data are from the Gallup World Poll (Gallup 2011). 
Notes: *Indicates that only developing countries are included. For example, Japan and South Korea are excluded from East Asia, 
and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are excluded from the Middle East and North Africa. 
a. Transition refers to 
former Communist countries. 
b. Members of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
c. Low income is 
defined as a 2005 GDP per capita of less than US$5,000 purchasing power parity (PPP), middle income as US$5,000–13,000, and 
upper income as greater than US$13,000. 
Figure 4.1 reports a scatter plot of the two measures. The correlation is a high 0.90, although as 
Figure 4.1 suggests, the relationship is slightly nonlinear, with self-reported food insecurity rising rapidly 
at low levels of hunger (less than 20 percent) and then more gradually thereafter. One explanation might 
be the hypothesis discussed in the previous section regarding the differing definitions of food for the poor 
and nonpoor. If food means a reasonably high-quality diet for the upper- and middle-income countries but 
basic staples for the lower-income countries, then one would expect hunger levels to be much lower than 
food insecurity levels for richer countries, and the two measures to be about the same for the developing 
countries. This is precisely what Figure 4.1 indicates. Moreover, in Table 4.2 we see that food insecurity 
and hunger levels in Africa are about the same (58.3 percent and 54.2 percent respectively). This suggests 
that in levels at least, the food insecurity indicator is probably biased upward in the upper- and middle-
income countries.  
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Figure 4.1—The relationship between the two GWP indicators 
 
Source: Data are from the Gallup World Poll (Gallup 2011). 
To explore other possible measurement problems, we now turn to comparing the GWP measures 
with other conceptually similar indicators, such as FAO hunger prevalence, World Bank poverty 
estimates, and anthropometric indicators of undernutrition. We stress again that this not a validation 
exercise, however. In the introduction we made reference to significant criticisms of the FAO and USDA 
measures of hunger. However, the standard World Bank poverty estimates have also been widely 
criticized,
14 and anthropometric indicators are heavily influenced by nonfood factors such as health, 
education, family planning, and cultural norms (World Bank 2006). Bearing that in mind, Table 4.3 
systematically tests whether the GWP self-reported indicators are significantly correlated with a range of 
other measures. All the variables are measured as close to 2005/06 (pre–food crisis) as possible, but in 
general the years do not coincide exactly, so this may weaken the correlations somewhat. Another 
problem is the paucity of some of the other indicators, which reduces the sample size. Even so, without 
exception Table 4.3 shows that GDP, income, poverty, hunger, and anthropometric indicators are 
significantly correlated with the two GWP indicators, and almost invariably at the one percent level. The 
correlations are particularly strong for the (logarithmic) income and poverty indicators. In a very small 
sample—that also excludes six important outliers—the correlation between the GWP indicators and the 
body mass index (BMI) of adult women is also very high (0.73 and 0.68 for hunger and food insecurity 
respectively). Appendix Table A.1 also shows that the correlations between the GWP measures and the 
other indicators are least as strong as the closest alternatives to the GWP indicators—the FAO hunger 
measures—if not stronger. 
   
                                                       
14 Indeed, in the context of critiquing standard poverty measures, Deaton (2010) suggested that the Gallup indicators used 
herein might even be more reliable than the World Bank estimates. As a rough demonstration of their suitability, Deaton showed 
that the food security variable is correlated with GDP.  
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Table 4.3—Correlations between the self-reported food security indicators and other indicators of 
income, poverty, hunger, and malnutrition, circa 2005 
Alternative poverty/hunger indicator 
(source) 




GDP per capita, PPP, log  Correlation  -0.71***  -0.62*** 
(World Bank)  # Obs.  44  41 
Household income per capita, US$, log  Correlation  -0.68***  -0.61*** 
(World Bank Povcal)  # Obs.  59  54 
Prevalence of hunger  Correlation  0.58***  0.49*** 
(FAO)  # Obs.  62  57 
Prevalence of poverty, US$1/day  Correlation  0.77***  0.64*** 
(World Bank Povcal)  # Obs.  58  54 
Prevalence of poverty, US$2/day  Correlation  0.67***  0.63*** 
(World Bank Povcal)  # Obs.  49  46 
Prevalence of low-BMI women, excluding outliers  Correlation  0.73***  0.68*** 
(DHS & WHO)  # Obs.  17  15 
Prevalence of underweight preschoolers, log  Correlation  0.55***  0.38** 
(DHS & WHO)  # Obs.  45  42 
Prevalence of stunted preschoolers, log  Correlation  0.48***  0.33** 
(DHS & WHO)  # Obs.  45  42 
Sources: Dependent variables are from the Gallup World Poll (Gallup 2011). Independent variables are sourced as follows: 
World Bank = World Bank (2010c) World Development Indicators. World Bank Povcal = World Bank (2010b). FAO = Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO 2011b). DHS = Demographic Health Surveys (Measure DHS 2010). WHO = World Health 
Organization (WHO 2010). 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are measured in 2005 or the 
nearest available year. Log indicates that variable is expressed in logarithms to account for a nonlinear relationship. Excluding 
outliers refers to the exclusion of six countries with the highest prevalence of low-BMI women in the sample, all above 20%: 
India, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Nepal, and Madagascar. Without this exclusion, the correlation is statistically 
insignificant. Samples vary in size because of the paucity of some of the poverty and malnutrition indicators. 
In addition to the correlations in Table 4.3 it is also interesting to explore in more detail one or 
two relationships of particular interest. For example, the FAO Hunger Index and the GWP self-reported 
hunger measure are in principle trying to measure the same latent factor. Likewise, monetary measures of 
poverty—such as the US$1
15 per day indicator—are historically based on poverty lines designed to 
measure the amount of income required to purchase an adequate number of calories (although many 
poverty lines have often subsequently been delinked from calorie affordability—see Deaton 2001, 2010). 
Pairing these conceptually similar indicators shows two interesting relationships. Surprisingly, the 
correlation between the FAO estimate of hunger prevalence and the GWP self-reported hunger indicator 
is fairly weak, at just 0.55. Figure 4.2 shows a scatter plot. If the two indicators were similarly scaled, the 
slope of the regression line should be equal to one and the coefficient equal to zero. The slope coefficient 
is substantially lower than one, suggesting that the FAO estimate of hunger prevalence is generally much 
lower than the GWP indicator. We note that this is consistent with the study of Smith, Alderman, and 
Aduayom (2006), in which FAO estimates of calorie insufficiency in 11 African countries were found to 
be substantially lower than those derived from household surveys. An important exception to this pattern 
is Ethiopia (ETH), where the GWP indicator seems to underestimate hunger for 2005/06.
16 
                                                       
15 All dollar amounts are in U.S. dollars. 
16 A number of factors could explain this. Error could come from either source. On the GWP side, there may be reporting 
biases—Ethiopia is a highly food insecure country, so what passes for hunger may be low relative other countries. Or the year in 
question may have produced a relatively good harvest.  
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Figure 4.2—A scatter plot of the self-reported GWP and estimated FAO indicators of hunger 
prevalence 
 
Sources: See Table 4.2 for sources. 
Note: The solid line is the regression line while the dashed line is the 45-degree line. 
In Figure 4.3 we compare the self-reported food insecurity indicator to the $1 per day indicator. 
In this case the slope coefficient is close to one, but the prevalence of poverty is generally somewhat 
higher than that of food insecurity. There is also considerable variation around the average relationship. 
Quite notably, poverty is much higher in India (IND), Bangladesh (BGD), and Nepal (NPL) than the food 
affordability indicators would suggest. Moreover, if one were to switch to $2 per day poverty India would 
be even more of an outlier since 86 percent of India’s population earn less than $2 per day, whereas only 
27 percent earn less than $1 per day (World Bank 2010a). In contrast to these South Asian countries, 
poverty in Kenya (KEN) is much lower than food insecurity, with the latter close to 70 percent. However, 
in 2007 the rate of self-reported food insecurity dropped to 56 percent in Kenya, suggesting that this 
outlier is explained by the fact that 2006 may have been an unusual year.  
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Figure 4.3—A scatter plot of self-reported food insecurity and US$1 per day poverty 
 
Sources: See Table 4.2 for sources. 
Note: The solid line is the regression line while the dashed line is the 45-degree line. 
To more systematically explore possible regional biases, Table 4.4 reports regressions of each 
GWP indicator against the hunger or poverty indicator most conceptually similar to it, as well as regional 
dummy variables. Regression 1 suggests that self-reported hunger is much higher in Africa than the FAO 
measure of hunger prevalence predicts, consistent with Smith, Alderman, and Aduayom (2006). The 
Latin American dummy is also significant at the 10 percent level and positive. This may be because the 
FAO measure underestimates the extent of inequality in food consumption in Latin America, although 
this is only a conjecture. Regression 2 suggests that self-reported food insecurity in South Asia is much 
lower than is predicted by $1 per day poverty, consistent with Figure 4.3. 
Table 4.4—Testing for regional anomalies in the relationships between self-reported measures and 
FAO and World Bank measures of hunger and poverty 
Regression number  1  2 
Dependent variable  Self-reported hunger  Self-reported food insecurity 
Included observations  61  46 
     
Constant  5.52  27.3*** 
FAO hunger prevalence  0.58***   
US$1/day poverty prevalence    0.56*** 
Africa dummy  33.1***  1.3 
Latin America dummy  9.6*  -1.07 
Transition
a dummy  -5.5  3.8 
South Asia dummy  -1.75  -25.6*** 
     
R-square  0.70  0.56 
Adjusted R-square  0.69  0.52 
Hunger/poverty coefficient 
significantly different from 1? 
Yes  Yes 
Sources: Dependent variables are from the Gallup World Poll (Gallup 2011). Independent variables are sourced as follows: 
US$1/day poverty from World Bank Povcal (World Bank 2010b), FAO hunger prevalence from Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO 2011b). 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
a. Transition refers to former Communist 
countries.  
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Another possible bias mentioned in the previous literature is that the food affordability indicator 
could be biased upward in situations where more educated individuals define food in terms of higher-
quality items. There are several examples in the data that appear consistent with that hypothesis. Former 
Communist (“transition”) countries with high levels of literacy often report surprisingly high levels of 
food insecurity, although not pervasively so. For example, while Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Croatia, and 
Hungary all have levels of self-reported food insecurity of 20 percent or below, the remaining “transition” 
countries have rates that vary from 22 percent in Belarus to 52 percent in Georgia, 48 in Romania, and 
37–47 percent in five central Asian states. Another anomaly is Sri Lanka, where self-reported food 
insecurity is almost as high as that of India and about the same as that of Pakistan. Yet adult literacy rates 
in Sri Lanka—at 90 percent—are far above those of its South Asian neighbors and poverty is much lower 
(Figure 4.4). Is Sri Lanka’s self-reported food insecurity higher than expected because literate Sri 
Lankans demand more of their diet? 
Despite this suggestion, it is important to more rigorously test that hypothesis. For example, food 
inflation and overall inflation in Sri Lanka have been very high in recent years (Headey and Fan 2008, 
2010), so the GWP indicator may be picking up genuine affordability problems there. To more 
systematically test for an education bias, Table 4.5 reports regressions of the self-reported food insecurity 
measure against literacy, after controlling for $1 per day poverty (regression 1), mean income (regression 
2), and self-reported hunger (regression 3). In the first two instances the coefficient on literacy is highly 
insignificant, but in regression 3 the coefficient is positive and significant, suggesting that—controlling 
for self-reported hunger—more educated countries typically report more problems with affording food. 
We also conducted the same tests for the self-reported hunger measure, but none of the literacy 
coefficients in those regressions were positive (results not reported). Moreover, since the self-reported 
hunger and food insecurity variables are derived from the same survey, it is possible that the coefficients 
are biased. Hence all we can conclude is that there is some suggestion that there may indeed be an 
education bias for the food insecurity indicator. Future work could more rigorously explore whether this 
bias is indeed genuine, perhaps with unit-level data from these surveys. 
Figure 4.4—Self-reported food insecurity is high in Sri Lanka despite higher literacy and lower 
poverty 
 
Sources: Self-reported food insecurity is from the Gallup World Poll (Gallup 2011), US$1/day poverty is from the World Bank 
Povcal (World Bank 2010b), and adult literacy is from the World Bank (2010c). 















































Table 4.5—Is self-reported food insecurity biased upward by better education? 
Regression no.  1  2  3 
# observations  44  44  69 
       
Constant  15.18  52.29***  -2.45 
US$1/day poverty  0.57***     
Income per capita    -0.07   
Self-reported hunger      0.94*** 
Adult literacy  0.14  -0.02  0.20*** 
       
R-square  0.36  0.28  0.81 
Adjusted R-square  0.33  0.25  0.81 
Sources: Dependent variables are from the Gallup World Poll (Gallup 2011). Independent variables are sourced as follows: 
US$1/day poverty and income per capita from World Bank Povcal (World Bank 2010b), adult literacy from World Bank (2010c). 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
One other means of gauging the validity of the self-reported GWP indicators is to test whether 
they are correlated with some indicator of food prices. In fact, the World Bank poverty indicators used 
above are based on a purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion factor (from 2005) that is constructed 
from the World Bank’s International Comparison Program (ICP), an international survey of a wide range 
of goods and services. This PPP conversion factor can also be disaggregated into its various components, 
including a food and nonalcoholic beverages component. However, to measure relative food prices we 
take the ratio of the PPP conversion factor for food to the exchange rate (World Bank 2008b). Ratios 
larger than 100 percent indicate that food is expensive. In general food is more expensive in richer 
countries—with ratios in excess of 120 percent in virtually all of the OECD (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development) countries—although among the developing countries there is still 
considerable variation in food price ratios.
17 For example, the food price ratio in India is just over 50 
percent, but it is 135 percent in Nigeria and similarly high in some other Sub-Saharan African countries. 
Regression 1 in Table 4.6 demonstrates this pattern more systematically. Specifically, the food price ratio 
rises by 2.8 percentage points for every $1,000 increase in GDP per capita (PPP). But the regression also 
shows regional variations through the specification of regional dummy variables. Although none of the 
coefficients are significant, the coefficient on the African dummy is only marginally insignificant, and the 
coefficient is quite large, suggesting that food appears to be unusually expensive in Africa. However, part 
of the interregional variation in price levels may also be related to the fact that the 2005 ICP was 
conducted on a region-by-region basis, with price levels initially measured relative to a regional 
benchmark. If this methodology induces any biases in regional price levels, then the dummy variables 
could be picking up methodological effects rather than true regional price differences. Hence, regression 1 
in Table 4.6 indicates that it is very important to control for both GDP per capita and regional effects 
when exploring the impact of price ratios on food insecurity and hunger. 
So in regressions 2 through 5 in Table 4.6 we regress the self-reported food insecurity and hunger 
indicators against this food price level and its square, while controlling for GDP per capita and its square 
and the regional dummies. In all the regressions, the coefficients on the food price ratio and its square are 
positive and negative respectively, suggesting that higher food prices are associated with high levels of 
self-reported food insecurity and hunger, after controlling for GDP per capita. However, in regression 2 
the coefficients on food insecurity are marginally insignificant at the 10 percent level, even though the 
sizes of the coefficients are similar. Figure 4.5 shows these diminishing marginal impacts of price 
increases. In general the impact is quite large. For example, in most developing countries the ratio varies 
                                                       
17 One reason that food prices vary within developing countries is that the tradability of food varies substantially, depending 
on diets, transport costs, and economic policies.  
19 
between 150 percent and 110 percent, and in that range a 10 percentage point increase in relative food 
prices would increase self-reported food insecurity or hunger by around 3 to 4 percentage points. 
Table 4.6—Are self-reported food security measures explained by relative food prices? 
Regression no.  1  2  3  4  5 
Dependent variable 
Food price 
level  Food insecurity 
Food 
insecurity  Hunger  Hunger 
# Observations  99  91  91  95  95 
           
Constant  61.74***  17.0**  31.1**  -17.6**  0.4 
GDP per capita (US$, 
1,000s)  2.80***  -3.1***  -2.3***  -4.0***  -2.3*** 
GDP per capita, sq.    0.04***  0.03***  0.06***  0.04*** 
Food price ratio    63.8***  48.7
#  106.4***  48.2*** 
Food price ratio, sq.    -19.4***  -9.2
#  -31.6***  -14.2** 
Africa dummy  30.46
#    18.6
#    23.0** 
Latin America dummy  -12.29    10.5    7.1 
Asia dummy  4.97    4.6  0.8  -2.2 
Europe-plus
a dummy  -12.53    5.9  0.8  -1.7 
           
R-square  0.65  0.73  0.76  0.76  0.84 
Adjusted R-square  0.63  0.72  0.75  0.75  0.83 
Sources: Dependent variables are from the Gallup World Poll (Gallup 2011). Independent variables are sourced as follows: GDP 
per capita from World Bank (2010c), food price ratio from World Bank (2008c). 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, and # indicates marginal insignificance at 
the 10% level. a. Europe-plus refers to Europe, plus North America and Australasia. 
Figure 4.5—The impact of a 10 percentage point increase in relative food prices on self-reported 
hunger and food insecurity 
 
Source: Simulation results based on the regressions in Table 4.6, with food price ratio expressed as percentages rather than ratios, 
as it is Table 4.6. 
Note: The food price ratio varies from a minimum of 47% to a maximum of 241%. 
In summary, the results in this section suggest that the GWP indicators of food insecurity and 
hunger are highly correlated with other indicators of poverty and food security as well as with relative 
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food prices. However, the correlation between self-reported hunger and the FAO hunger index is 
relatively low given that these indicators aim to measure the same underlying phenomenon. Yet, 
consistent with the findings of Smith, Alderman, and Aduayom (2006), we also find that the FAO 
approach may well be underestimating hunger prevalence, especially in Africa (Ethiopia is an exception, 
however). Finally, despite the fact that cross-country patterns in the GWP indicators look plausible, there 
are some indications that the food insecurity indicator may be biased upward by higher education levels, 
although the evidence in that regard is not robust. Finally, while the correlations with other food 
insecurity and poverty indicators are strong, there are some problematic outliers, especially in the first 
wave of the GWP (2005/06). These outliers include Nepal and Senegal (where self-reported food 
insecurity seems too low in 2005/06), and China, Kenya, and Ghana (where it seems too high in 2005/06). 
Appendix B provides the full dataset of GWP self-reported food insecurity and hunger so readers can 
peruse individual observations at length. 
How significant these problems are for the main objective of this paper depends on whether these 
potential errors are biases that persist over time (in which case trends in these variables may not be 
biased), or whether they are one-off errors related to the 2005/06 round (which could distort trends from 
2005/06 to the crisis years). In China, for example, there is some suggestion that the 2005/06 estimate 
was a one-off error and it may be that the first wave of the GWP involved larger measurement errors than 
subsequent waves. This needs to be borne in mind, and it is a problem that we aim to address in Section 7, 
where we conduct various sensitivity analyses in estimating trends in self-reported food insecurity.  
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5.  ARE WITHIN-COUNTRY TRENDS IN SELF-REPORTED INDICATORS 
PLAUSIBLE? 
While it is interesting to explore the plausibility of the GWP variables as indicators of cross-country 
differences in hunger and food insecurity, the main objective of this paper is to assess whether these 
indicators are useful for gauging global trends in food security during the food, fuel, and financial crises. 
To answer that question we need to look at whether changes in these variables are indeed influenced by 
economic growth and food inflation. However, that task is rather tricky because the GWP surveys are 
conducted in individual months. Since there are no monthly or even quarterly GDP data available for 
most developing countries, we just use the percent change in GDP per capita between the year in which 
the GWP survey was conducted and the year in which the previous survey was conducted. With regard to 
food inflation, monthly food consumer price index (CPI) data are available from the International Labour 
Organization. Hence we take the change in the food CPI between the respective months of consecutive 
GWP surveys. Note, however, that the CPI for each month actually refers to the maximum monthly CPI 
over the previous 12 months, since the GWP question refers to food insecurity or hunger over the 
previous 12 months. Also note that we run two sensitivity analyses, the results of which are reported in 
the appendix. First, we test overall CPI inflation rather than food inflation (Table A.4), in case nonfood 
inflation (for example, fuel prices) put an additional squeeze on household food expenditures. Second, 
since the food CPI is not usually weighted to the foods that poor people consume (staples) we use the 
FAO (2010) data to construct an index of staple food prices, with the calorie shares of food items used as 
weights in the index. We then test the impact of inflation in this staple food index on changes in self-
reported food insecurity (Table A.5). 
Before turning to the main results, a final consideration is whether domestic food inflation is 
influenced by international price changes. In other words, is the domestic food inflation in recent years 
generally the result of the global food and fuel crises? In appendix Table A.2 we regress monthly food 
and overall CPI inflation against the one-month lag of changes in international prices of fuel and food, 
expressed in domestic currencies (to capture the extent to which exchange rate movements influence price 
transmission). As predicted, the results show that international food inflation is a significant determinant 
of domestic food and overall inflation (for overall inflation, the effects are much stronger in low-income 
countries, where food is a larger part of the consumption bundle). For example, the results suggest that the 
77 percent increase in the FAO food price index from June 2006 to June 2008 (the peak of the crisis) 
typically raised the domestic food CPI by 3.0 percent. Moreover, this is a lower-bound estimate because 
domestic food bundles will often vary substantially from the food bundle in the FAO food price index. As 
for fuel inflation, this has some impact on overall inflation but no significant effect on domestic food 
inflation (of course, fuel inflation could still be a determinant of international food price inflation). So the 
short answer to the question posed above is that domestic inflation (both food inflation and overall 
inflation) was certainly influenced by the global food crisis. 
In Table 5.1 we therefore test whether economic growth and food CPI inflation explain changes 
in the GWP indicators, while Table A.2 in the appendix reports the results for overall inflation rather than 
food inflation. The underlying model for these regressions is that the prevalence of food insecurity (H) at 
time t in country i is a function of the log of mean level of GDP per capita (y) and the log of food prices 
over the previous 12 months (𝑃): 
  𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = 𝗽𝑌 ln𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝗽𝜋 ln𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡  (1) 
Note that v is a fixed-effect term whereas u is a time-varying error term. Hence the first difference 
of (1) leads to changes in food insecurity being a function of the per capita economic growth rate and the 
food inflation rate: 
  ∆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = 𝗽𝑌 ∆ln𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝗽𝜋∆ln𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + ∆𝑢𝑖,𝑡.  (2)  
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Several points regarding equation (2) are of note. First, we run a variation of (2) in which the 
percent change in H is modeled as the dependent variable—implying that y and P were measured in levels 
rather than logs in equation (1). This variation means the coefficients in (2) represent elasticities. 
Although the estimation of elasticities is standard in the growth and poverty literature, taking percent 
changes of a prevalence rate can cause scaling problems and create outliers (Deaton 2006; Headey 
2011b).
18 However, it is useful to estimate an elasticity for the purposes of drawing comparisons with the 
impact of economic growth on poverty. In all regressions we are also careful to omit obvious outliers. For 
example, Zimbabwe is always excluded because of its hyperinflation. 
Second, in all regressions we interact economic growth and inflation with income dummy 
variables. There is a good rationale for this. In upper-income countries the income elasticity of food 
consumption with respect to income is often close to zero, so economic growth has little or no potential to 
reduce food insecurity or hunger (moreover, hunger and food insecurity prevalence are close to zero in 
most upper-income countries). The effect of food inflation is also likely to be conditional because food is 
a smaller part of a richer household’s budget, so an increase in food inflation is less likely to lead to 
problems of food affordability. 
Third, we note that some authors add a fixed-effect term to (2) to capture country trend effects 
(Christiaensen, Demery, and Kühl forthcoming). However, with panel data, estimates with fixed effects 
are consistent only if the right-hand-side variables are strictly exogenous, meaning they are orthogonal to 
the error term at all lags and all leads. This means the error term cannot be correlated with future growth 
or future prices, which is not credible here. Yet the exclusion of fixed effects can cause other problems, 
such as omitted variables bias. Hence we run a variation with fixed effects included. 
Fourth, we also include time trends in some of our results (regressions 3 and 4). The idea here is 
to pick up the effects of global events, including global economic growth (strong prior to the financial 
crisis and lower thereafter) and inflation trends. While potentially informative, these results come with the 
caveat that the panel is highly unbalanced in a temporal sense, with different surveys conducted in 
different months and even different years. So the time dummies in question are only very approximate in 
that they denote the year of the most recent survey of the differenced variable. 
Finally, in the main text we report only the results with self-reported food insecurity as the 
dependent variable. Results with self-reported hunger as the dependent variable are reported in Appendix 
Table A.5, but the results are highly insignificant, most probably for two reasons. First, the sample size is 
much smaller (190-odd observations relative to 260 in the case of self-reported food insecurity). Second, 
many observations are zero, with no change being recorded between successive surveys. This not only 
violates the normality assumptions of least squares regressions (as confirmed by a Jarque–Bera test), but 
it also means that this measure is unlikely to be suitable for picking up time trends and the impacts of 
price or income changes. 
   
                                                       
18 The problem with taking percent changes in prevalence rates can be illustrated with an example of a country with high 
food insecurity and a country with low food insecurity. In the food-insecure country, suppose that food insecurity decreases from 
42 percent at time t-1 to 40 percent at time t. This yields a first difference of two percentage points and a percent change of 
around -4.7 percent (that is, 2/40*100). Yet an equally large reduction in malnutrition prevalence in the food-secure country from 
4 to 2 percent yields a percent change of 50 percent. Not only is a 50 percent change likely to be an outlier, but it is also 10 times 
the value of the equally large reduction in malnutrition in the high-malnutrition country. Of course, one could argue that this may 
not matter if percent differences are applied to the right-hand-side variables, but in the case of per capita income, this is not true 
because the denominator (initial income) is invariably large enough to produce more meaningful estimates of percent change. 
Moreover, percent changes in income make sense if there is a diminishing marginal impact of income on food insecurity.  
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Table 5.1—Are changes in self-reported food insecurity explained by economic growth and food 
inflation? 
Regression   1  2  3  4 
Dependent variable
a  Change in food 
insecurity 
Percent change in 
food insecurity 
Change in food 
insecurity 
Percent change 
in food insecurity 
Number of countries  107  109  74  74 
Number of observations  254  257  185  185 




Constant  0.06  2.42  -1.06***  3.43 
Economic growth
b (low income)  -0.44***  -0.99**  -0.41**  -1.17** 
Food inflation
c (low income)
  0.22***  0.54***  0.12  0.27 
Growth*upper income   0.26
#  -0.16     
nflation*upper income    -0.18**  -0.30     
Growth*middle income   0.37
#  0.87
  0.35*  0.84
# 
nflation*middle income    -0.10  -0.19     
2008 dummy      3.68  4.95 
2009 dummy       2.97
#  5.70 
2010 dummy      3.60**  5.79 
2008 dummy*middle income      -0.37  2.92 
2009 dummy*middle income      -3.79**  -12.18* 
2010 dummy*middle income      -2.74  -7.62 
         
R-square  0.09  0.06  0.13  0.08 
Sources: Dependent variables are from the Gallup World Poll (Gallup 2011). Independent variables are sourced as follows: 
Economic growth from World Bank (2010c), food inflation from International Labour Organization (ILO 2011). 
Notes: These are ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively, and # indicates marginal insignificance at the 10% level. 
a. The dependent variable is measured as the change in 
food insecurity between month M in year Y and the time of the previous survey (Mt-1 and Yt-1). 
b. Economic growth is the percent 
change in GDP per capita between the two years in which the GWP surveys were conducted. 
c. Food inflation is the percent 
change in the food consumer price index (CPI) between the month of the GWP survey and the month of the previous GWP 
survey, where the food CPI in any given month is actually the maximum food CPI in the previous 12 months. 
d. Low income is 
defined as a 2005 GDP per capita of less than US$5,000 PPP, middle income as US$5,000–13,000, and upper income as greater 
than US$13,000. Note that by this definition China is defined as a low-income country. 
This is in marked contrast to the results in Table 5.1, where we find strong evidence that self-
reported food insecurity is indeed explained by changes in mean incomes and food prices, with the effects 
generally varying by income level. For example, in regression 1 of Table 5.1 we observe that if mean per 
capita income in a low-income economy were to grow by 10 percent then the country could expect the 
prevalence of food insecurity to go down by 4.4 percentage points. However, the interactions with income 
brackets suggest that growth effects in middle- and upper-income countries are significantly smaller. In 
the case of middle-income countries the impact of economic growth is insignificantly different from zero. 
In upper-income countries the impact of growth is significantly different from zero, but the point estimate 
is about 60 percent lower than is the case in low-income countries. In regression 2 in Table 5.1 we 
measure the change in food insecurity as a percent change in order to derive a conventional elasticity that 
is comparable to other elasticities in the poverty–growth literature. The elasticity of food insecurity with 
respect to economic growth is -0.99 in low-income countries (regression 2 in Table 5.1), which is 
certainly commensurate to the poverty–growth elasticities obtained in that literature (Loayza and Raddatz 
2010). 
Food inflation also has larger impacts in lower- and middle-income countries than in upper-
income countries. In low- and middle-income countries a 10 percent increase in food prices is predicted to 
increase food insecurity by around 2 percentage points. In regression 2 in Table 5.1 we see that the  
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elasticity of food insecurity with respect to changes in inflation is around +0.54. It is also pertinent to 
compare the point estimates of the growth and food inflation coefficients. In both regressions 1 and 2 
Wald tests confirm that the coefficients on food inflation are significantly smaller in absolute size than the 
coefficients on growth for low-income countries, although the variation in food inflation rates is also 
somewhat larger (a standard deviation of 8.4 percentage points relative to 6.2 for economic growth).
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Even so, it is interesting to observe such a strong impact of economic growth on food insecurity, 
particularly since the relevant GWP question does not specifically ask about disposable income. And 
given that the developing countries—especially the most populous ones—generally grew very quickly 
both before and during the food crisis, this should give readers an inkling that global trends in self-
reported food insecurity may not be so dire. 
In regressions 3 and 4 in Table 5.1 we exclude upper-income countries and pool lower- and 
middle-income countries, but add time trends that are interacted with income levels. Relative to the base 
of 2007 (omitted from the table), we do not find strong time period effects, although for low-income 
countries all trend effects were positive from 2008 to 2010, but only significant for 2010 (and marginally 
insignificant for 2009). Interestingly, the opposite results hold for middle-income countries, which again 
suggests that their vulnerability to global economic shocks might be quite different. Another point of note 
is that the addition of time trends seems to reduce the statistical significance of the coefficient attached to 
food inflation, although it leaves the growth coefficient unharmed. Hence the time trend effects could 
indeed be picking up the effect of the global food crisis, but less so economic growth effects since growth 
rates vary more across countries within any given time period. 
What about our sensitivity analyses? The results in Appendix Tables A.4 and A.5, in which 
overall inflation and staple food inflation indexes are used, respectively, are both qualitatively and 
quantitatively very similar to the food inflation results in Table 5.1, once each series is scale adjusted. For 
example, if we adjust the scale of each inflation series by its standard deviation (using Table A.3 in the 
appendix) we observe that the point estimates of the effects of food inflation and overall inflation are 
exactly the same. The point estimates of the staple food price index tend to be lower (though still highly 
significant), a fact perhaps related to greater measurement error (in particular, the observed staples cover 
a large part of the diets in some countries but a smaller part in others). The fact that food inflation and 
overall inflation yield very similar results is interesting from a theoretical standpoint, although one should 
be cautious in drawing strong inferences. It may be that nonfood inflation (for example, increasing fuel 
prices) squeezed the food budget, but the reality in many developing countries is that overall inflation is 
heavily affected by food inflation since food makes up a large share of the budget and since food prices 
vary substantially over time (within years and between years). Unfortunately, nonfood inflation data are 
not publicly reported for all countries, but future work could explore whether there is indeed a specific 
effect of nonfood inflation on self-reported food insecurity. 
   
                                                       
19 If one conducts a Wald test of the null hypothesis that the low-income growth coefficient is equal to 8.6/6.2 times the 
inflation coefficient, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 14% level.  
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Table 5.2—Are changes in self-reported food insecurity explained by economic growth and food 
inflation? Results with fixed effects included 
Regression   1  2  3  4 
Dependent variable
a  Change in food 
insecurity 
Percent change in 
food insecurity 
Change in food 
insecurity 
Percent change 
in food insecurity 
Number of countries  107  107  74  74 
Number of observations  254  254  185  185 




Constant  0.54  6.81  -0.32  11.35 
Economic growth
b (low income)




  0.30***  0.74***  0.15
#  0.36 
Growth*upper income   0.62**  1.43#     
nflation*upper income    -0.33**  -1.69     
Growth*middle income   0.63*
  2.13*
  -0.35  -0.99
 
nflation*middle income    -0.24
#  -0.77
#     
2008 dummy      5.60
#  9.20 
2009 dummy       5.98
#  10.85 
2010 dummy      4085*  10.05 
2008 dummy*middle income      -7.97**  -20.96
# 
2009 dummy*middle income      -13.31**  -42.51** 
2010 dummy*middle income      -5.40  -17.70 
         
R-square  0.37  0.43  0.41  0.40 
Sources: Dependent variables are from the Gallup World Poll (Gallup 2011). Independent variables are sourced as follows: 
Economic growth from World Bank (2010c), food inflation from International Labour Organization (ILO 2011). 
Notes: These are ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively, and # indicates marginal insignificance at the 10% level. 
a. The dependent variable is measured as the 
change in food insecurity between month M in year Y and the previous survey (Mt-1 and Yt-1). 
b. Economic growth is the percent 
change in GDP per capita between the two years in which the GWP surveys were conducted. 
c. Food inflation is the percent 
change in the food consumer price index (CPI) between the month of the GWP survey and the month of the previous GWP 
survey, where the food CPI in any given month is actually the maximum food CPI in the previous 12 months. 
d. Low income is 
defined as a 2005 GDP per capita of less than US$5,000 PPP, middle income as US$5,000–13,000, and upper income as greater 
than US$13,000. Note that by this definition China is defined as a low-income country. 
In addition to these sensitivity tests, recall that we also re-estimated the regressions in Tables 5.2, 
A.3, and A.4 with fixed effects. Although this was not our preferred approach because the assumptions of 
a fixed effects panel model are unlikely to hold, it turns out that the decision was immaterial since the 
inclusion of fixed effects makes little difference to the results (Table 5.2). Indeed, if anything, the 
magnitude of the coefficients increases in absolute size. For example, the coefficient on economic growth 
for low-income countries (regression 1, Table 5.2) increases from -0.44 to -0.70, and the analogous 
coefficient on food inflation increases from 0.22 to 0.30. The interaction terms with middle- and upper-
income dummies also become significant (or marginally insignificant) in all cases. Hence the association 
between self-reported food insecurity trends, economic growth, and food inflation is quite a robust one, at 
least for the time period in question. 
In summary, what can we take from all of these results? First, the fact that changes in self-
reported food insecurity are strongly explained by both economic growth (negatively) and domestic 
inflation (positively) suggests that changes in self-reported food insecurity are measuring precisely what 
we want them to: changes in disposable income. The only significant caveat is that because of 
measurement error and other omitted variables, the coefficients of determination for these regressions are 
quite low. Without fixed effects, economic growth and food inflation explain about 10 percent of the 
variation in self-reported food insecurity trends over time.  
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6.  ESTIMATING BASIC TRENDS IN SELF-REPORTED FOOD INSECURITY AT THE 
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS DURING THE FOOD, FUEL, AND  
FINANCIAL CRISES 
Although we have noted potential problems with the GWP indicators in previous sections, in this section 
we take a first stab at estimating trends in self-reported food insecurity without making any allowances 
for possible errors. In the subsequent section, however, we conduct a range of sensitivity analyses on the 
assumption that there are possible measurement errors in the 2005/06 GWP round, particularly in China. 
As for the measurement of basic trends, this is complicated slightly by two issues. First, the GWP 
surveys are not conducted in the same months in all countries. Some surveys are conducted in the 
beginning of a calendar year, others toward the end. This is important because the food crisis covered the 
second half of 2007 and at least the first half of 2008, so some surveys in 2007 may not be picking up the 
effects of the crisis. Hence we ignore 2007 data on the grounds that it is ambiguous vis-à-vis picking up 
the effects of rising food and fuel prices. Another timing issue is that in the first wave of the GWP some 
surveys were conducted in 2005 and others in 2006. In order to pick up the effects of the food–fuel and 
financial crises, three periods were therefore selected: (1) a pre-crisis period covering surveys conducted 
in 2005 or 2006 (the first wave of the GWP); (2) a food–fuel crisis period of surveys conducted in 2008, 
mostly the latter half (the third wave of the GWP);
20 and (3) a financial crisis period (2009), which may 
pick up some of the early effects of the financial crisis as well as late effects of the food crisis (the fourth 
wave of the GWP). Note that since the GWP food insecurity question is retrospective over a 12-month 
period, we denote these three periods as 2005/06, 2007/08, and 2008/09. 
A second issue is that our sample of countries is large but not universal. After excluding high-
income countries,
21 our sample of 70 developing countries over 2005/06–2007/08 covers 79 percent of 
the population of the developing world (and 67 percent of the total world population), including China, 
India, Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, Nigeria, and many other large developing countries. We also use a 
subsample of 57 developing countries for which data for 2008/09 are also available, which covers 77 
percent of the developing-world population. However, there are also important exclusions from both 
samples because of lack of data for one or more time periods. These include all five North African 
countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Egypt); Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
Sudan (the second-, third-, and fifth-largest Sub-Saharan African countries); and the Philippines (a 
country of around 85 million). The exclusion of these countries is unfortunate not only because they are 
populous but also because there are strong reasons to suspect that many of them suffered considerably 
from rising prices. Hence in the sensitivity analysis below we will estimate some food insecurity trends in 
these countries in order to gauge how important their exclusion from the present sample is. 
Turning now to our core results, Table 6.1 reports trends in food insecurity in the 70-country 
sample and the 57-country subsample. For both samples we report unweighted means and population-
weighted means. The results for these two means are very different. In an “average” developing country, 
self-reported food insecurity rose slightly from 2005/06 to 2007/08 in all 70 countries and fell very 
slightly in the subsample of 57 countries. However, the population-weighted mean dropped very sharply 
over these two periods, from 35.3 percent to 26.2 percent in the 70-country sample, and from 34.7 percent 
to 25.3 percent in the 57-country subsample. The latter sample does show, however, that food insecurity 
increased slightly from 2007/08 to 2008/09 (from 25.3 percent to 27.5 percent). Yet the overall trend in 
global self-reported food insecurity is undoubtedly very favorable over the entire period. Specifically, 
                                                       
20 In 2008 only one sampled survey was conducted before April (Indonesia, where the survey finished on March 25, when 
international food prices were already very high). Hence all the 2008 values for food insecurity—which are 12-month 
retrospective answers—cover the first half of 2008, and most cover the last few months of 2007 as well. 
21 The exclusion of high-income countries is based on the grounds that (1) self-reported food insecurity in these countries is 
more likely to pertain to less exigent definitions of food and (2) these countries show little change in food insecurity and are less 
likely to be influenced by rising international prices because of the greater consumption of processed foods, in which raw 
materials are only a small component of total cost.  
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Table 6.2 shows that there was a huge decline in the number of self-reported food-insecure people from 
2005/06 to 2008/09: around 400 million people are estimated to fallen out of this type of food insecurity, 
although 100 million fell into food insecurity in 2008/09. 
Table 6.1—Trends in self-reported food insecurity in the developing world: Weighted and 
unweighted means 
  2005/06  2007/08  2008/09 
Total sample (70 countries)       
Unweighted mean  39.1%  39.8%   
Population-weighted mean  35.3%  26.2%   
All three years (57 countries)       
Unweighted mean  36.9%  36.6%  38.3% 
Population-weighted mean  34.7%  25.3%  27.5% 
Source: Author’s calculations from GWP (Gallup 2011) self-reported food insecurity prevalence rates and 2006 World Bank 
(2010c) population numbers. 
Table 6.2—Estimated trends in the numbers of food-insecure people (millions) in 57 developing 
countries 
  2005/06  2007/08  2008/09 
Estimated “food-insecure” population  1502.1  1094.2  1191.3 
Change in “food-insecure” population    -407.9  97.1 
Source: Author’s calculations from GWP (Gallup 2011) self-reported food insecurity prevalence rates and 2006 World Bank 
(2010c) population numbers. 
Table 6.3—Regional trends in self-reported food insecurity (% prevalence) 
Developing region  # obs.  2005/06  2007/08  2008/09 
Big and fast growing*  9  33.1  26.7  29.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa  14  55.8  54.6  57.2 
 West Africa, coastal  4  48.5  51.3  58.0 
 West Africa, Sahel  5  59.6  49.2  55.2 
 Eastern & southern Africa  5  57.8  62.8  58.6 
Latin America & Caribbean  15  33.2  36.4  35.7 
 Central America, Caribbean  7  38.4  41.4  40.3 
 South America  8  28.6  32.0  31.6 
Middle East  3  19.7  26.0  21.3 
Transition countries  13  31.9  30.2  34.6 
 Eastern Europe  6  21.8  19.7  25.8 
 Central Asia  7  40.6  39.1  42.1 
Asia  12  30.6  28.3  29.7 
 East Asia  7  33.3  29.3  30.4 
 South Asia  5  26.8  26.8  28.6 
Source: Author’s calculations from GWP (Gallup 2011) self-reported food insecurity prevalence rates. 
Note: *“Big and fast growing” includes China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Mexico, and Vietnam. 
What could explain this remarkable result? One means of accounting for the change is to break up 
developing countries by region, and another is to examine the largest countries separately. In the top row 
of Table 6.3, for example, we group the largest nine developing countries together: China, India, 
Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Mexico, and Vietnam. Together these countries account  
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for 57 percent of the total population of the 70-country sample, so what happens in these countries largely 
determines the overall trends observed in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. This is indeed evident in Table 6.3, where 
average (unweighted) self-reported food insecurity among these countries fell from 33.1 percent in 
2005/06 to 26.7 percent in 2008, before rising again to 29.1 percent in 2009. Figure 6.1 also shows the 
individual trends for these nine countries. The huge reductions in self-reported food insecurity in China 
and India are perhaps the most striking results, given that these countries contain about 40 percent of the 
population of our 70-country sample. In India the trend of declining insecurity was reversed somewhat 
from 2007/08 to 2008/09, and similar patterns hold for Pakistan, Nigeria, and Vietnam. In the other 
countries there are no major changes. In China self-reported food insecurity fell by a scarcely credible 20 
percentage points (an issue we take up in the next section). 
Figure 6.1—Self-reported food insecurity trends in the most populous developing countries 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from GWP (Gallup 2011) self-reported food insecurity prevalence rates.  
Are the results for these large countries plausible? In Figure 6.2 we plot trends in three statistics 
for these countries for the period from 2005/06 to 2007/08: the reduction in self-reported food insecurity, 
the annual per capita economic growth rate over that period, and the change in CPI inflation over that 
period. There are several striking features of Figure 6.2. First, from 2005 or 2006 to 2008 these countries 
saw per capita incomes rise from anywhere between 13 percent (Nigeria) and 29 percent (China). Second, 
the percentage changes in food prices was high, but lower than in most other developing countries, and 
about the same as the percentage change in per capita incomes. Third, looking at the relationships 
between the three variables one observes a very strong correlation between economic growth rates and 
reductions in food insecurity (the lightest and darkest lines, respectively). The correlation between the two 
variables for all nine countries is 0.67, but if one excludes Bangladesh and Brazil (two countries where 
food insecurity rose slightly), the correlation rises to an astonishing 0.93. In other words, it looks like the 
main driver of reduced food insecurity in the developing world’s largest countries was rapid economic 
growth. Changes in food prices, however, are perversely positively correlated with reductions in food 
insecurity (at 0.54). This may be because food inflation has some positive relationship with economic 
growth (at 0.57). So all in all, it looks like economic growth has been the main driver of food-insecurity 
trends in these big countries. 
We will further explore the plausibility of these trends in China and India below, but for now we 
turn back to the trends within other developing regions reported in Table 6.3. Previous research showed 
that much of Sub-Saharan Africa experienced relatively rapid food inflation in 2008 (Headey and Fan  
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2010; Minot 2010). Our results show very diverse patterns across African regions, however. West African 
countries saw some increase in food insecurity, which is perhaps unsurprising given that many import 
substantial amounts of rice and, in some cases, other cereals as well. The inland Sahelian and Saharan 
countries in West Africa actually saw substantial declines in food insecurity, on average, while eastern 
and southern African countries saw substantial increases in food insecurity. If Ethiopia were added to this 
last group, the increase might be even more pronounced, since 2005 and 2006 GWP data report rising 
self-reported food insecurity while the unsurveyed years of 2007 and 2008 constitute a period of very 
rapid food inflation in that country (see our sensitivity analysis below). 
Figure 6.2—Trends in food insecurity, economic growth, and inflation in the developing world’s ten 
most populous countries: 2005/06 to 2007/08 
 
Sources: Reduction in food insecurity is from the Gallup World Poll (Gallup 2011). Economic growth is total growth in GDP per 
capita between 2005/06 and 2007/08, and is sourced from World Bank (2010c). Change in inflation is the total change in the 
inflation rate between 2005/06 and 2007/08 from World Bank (2008a). 
In Latin America, self-reported food insecurity rose by around 4 percentage points, a result 
broadly consistent with survey-based simulation analyses for Latin America—for example, Robles and 
Torero (2010), who estimated about a 2 percentage point rise in poverty for a 10 percent increase in food 
prices. Moreover, the observed increases in the GWP measure are about the same for Central America 
and the Caribbean as they are for South America. Among the countries witnessing the largest increases in 
self-reported food insecurity are El Salvador (from 40 percent to 48 percent), Honduras (from 42 percent 
to 48 percent), and the Dominican Republic (from 48 percent to 59 percent). In Haiti, where there were 
widely publicized food riots, which in turn caused a regime change, food insecurity actually fell over this 
period (from 63 percent to 60 percent), although the levels in both years were easily the highest in the 
region. In South America it appears that Ecuador was the worst-affected country, since food insecurity 
rose from 36 percent before the crisis to 46 percent during the crisis period of 2007/08. 
We have data for only three Middle Eastern countries (Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan), so the 
sharp increase in this region may be very sensitive to the inclusion of more countries (see Section 7 
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26 percent in 2005/06 to 47 percent in 2007/08 before falling again to 37 percent in 2008/09. It is quite 
likely that food insecurity rose in other Middle Eastern and North African countries, as we discuss below. 
Among the formerly Communist “transition” countries there was very little change on average, 
but this masks considerable diversity across the countries. Some transition countries saw significant 
declines in food insecurity, on the order of 6–15 percentage points (Romania, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, 
Tajikistan), but Azerbaijan was a big exception, with food insecurity rising from 37 percent to 60 percent. 
Finally, self-reported food insecurity in eastern and southern Asia declined on average. Among 
East Asian countries food insecurity declined by 4 percentage points on average, but there is again a lot of 
diversity. China, Cambodia, and Vietnam saw large decreases, while Laos and Thailand saw increases of 
8–12 percentage points, and as we discuss below, food insecurity probably increased somewhat in the 
Philippines. In South Asia, food insecurity fell in India and Pakistan, as we noted above, but rose slightly 
in Bangladesh and sharply in Sri Lanka, where inflation was in double digits as a result of the large 
government deficits run up during the civil war (Headey and Fan 2008).
22 
                                                       
22 One final point of interest is the issue of tradability in Asian rice markets, with the data suggesting that both importers and 
exporters can be adversely affected by rising international prices. For example, the Philippines is regularly the world’s largest 
importer of rice, so it is obvious that domestic food inflation would be directly related to the higher cost of rice imports. But 
exporters can be affected too. Previous research has shown that Thailand’s decision not to restrict its rice exports during the crisis 
did indeed lead to a sharp increase in domestic rice prices, in contrast with India, where rice exports were heavily restricted 
(Headey 2010).  
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7.  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
The results above suggest that self-reported food insecurity in around 70 percent of the developing 
world’s population fell sharply from 2005/06 to 2007/08 by around 400 million people before rising by 
around 100 million from 2007/08 to 2008/09. Since this is undoubtedly a controversial result, it behooves 
us to consider whether the result is sensitive to the exclusion of some important countries or to alternative 
assumptions about events in China and India (the two countries that account for the largest country shares 
of this huge decline) or to more general measurement error. 
Beginning with the China–India question, a first point of note is that excluding these two 
countries from our sample would suggest that self-reported food insecurity did indeed rise among the 
remaining 68-country sample, but only by 9 million people (and then by another 12 million people from 
2007/08 to 2008/09). This result still conflicts with estimates of the FAO, USDA, and World Bank of the 
change in poverty and hunger resulting from the crisis, which put the rise somewhere between 75 million 
and 160 million people. Moreover, the fact that self-reported food insecurity did not rise by a greater 
number still mainly seems to stem from the strong economic performance of other large developing 
countries (Figure 6.2 above). 
More importantly, the exclusion of China and India is obviously not a valid one if one wants to 
assess global poverty trends. That said, in Section 3 we noted concerns over the self-reported food 
insecurity trends in China because in the 2005/06 round the food affordability question followed more 
general questions about income, which may have primed respondents in that year to be more likely to 
answer yes to the question about food affordability. Certainly the 20 percentage point reduction in self-
reported food insecurity from 2006 to 2008 is not very credible. Suppose, then, that we re-estimate global 
food insecurity trends after using an alternative series for China and India. Specifically, if we take the 
extreme position of keeping self-reported food insecurity constant in China (or equivalently, excluding 
China from the calculations), but keep the Indian series as is, then global self-reported food insecurity still 
falls by about 132 million people. Or suppose that we use the margins of error reported by the GWP, 
which are around 3 percentage points at the 95 percent confidence interval, to re-estimate flatter trends for 
India and China by reducing their reported food insecurity rates by 3 points in 2005/06 and increasing the 
reported values by 3 points in 2007/08. If we carry out that exercise, then global food insecurity still falls 
by 250 million people. If one adopts an even stricter but more arbitrary assumption regarding China, 
namely that self-reported food insecurity in China fell by just 10 percentage points rather than 20 points 
from 2005/06 to 2007/08, then global self-reported food insecurity fell by around 200 million people. 
Finally, suppose we discredit the GWP numbers for China and India entirely, and instead arbitrarily 
assume that self-reported food insecurity fell by just 3 percentage points in both countries (after all, their 
economic growth and food inflation were conducive to at least this much reduction). Under that 
assumption, global food insecurity still fell by 63 million people. In short, various assumptions about the 
nature of any error in the 2005/06 GWP surveys in China and India still suggest that global food 
insecurity fell by a large number. 
What about some potentially important omissions from the 70 countries on which our “global” 
estimates in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 were based? As we noted above, most of the developing world’s largest 
countries have complete data for the three periods considered, but there are some sizable countries 
excluded. North Africa is excluded entirely, while three of Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest countries are also 
excluded, as well as three medium-size countries on that continent. In Latin America, Peru is a reasonably 
large country, while Paraguay is small. And in East Asia there is only one major exclusion, the 
Philippines, but that country has almost 85 million people, making it another sizable omission. 
These 16 excluded countries are listed in Table 7.1, where we note that their total population 
comprises nearly half a billion people. Table 7.1 therefore also reports what data are available for these 
countries, before estimating some plausible trends in the self-reported food insecurity indicator based on 
trends in real domestic staple food prices from the FAO (2010), inflation data from the IMF (2011) when 
FAO data are unavailable, and post-2008 trends in the GWP self-reported food insecurity indicator (that  
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is, if this indicator fell after 2008, this would suggest that food insecurity in 2008 might have been 
unusually high). 
We note that in all cases we have made very generous assumptions about the extent of change in 
the food insecurity indicator. Even so, there are also good grounds to think that many of these 16 
countries were quite adversely affected by the global food crisis. North Africa, for example, is a huge 
wheat importer (Egypt is typically the largest wheat importer in the world) that has experienced 
significant inflation in recent years and subsequent civil unrest in early 2011, including regime changes in 
Tunisia and Egypt. Ethiopia experienced very rapid food inflation from 2005 onward. From 2005/06 to 
2006/07 self-reported food insecurity in Ethiopia rose by 14 percentage points. Since overall inflation 
peaked at around 60 percent in July 2008, it is highly likely that food insecurity kept rising in Ethiopia 
after the early GWP surveys terminated there. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan 
also saw sharp increases in staple food prices (Table 7.1). And finally, the Philippines is typically the 
largest rice importer in the world, and in the first quarter of 2008 it made what is widely regarded as a 
“panic purchase” that contributed to a further increase in international rice prices (specifically, the 
Philippines purchased more rice in the first quarter of 2008 that it did in all of 2007, mostly from 
Vietnam—see Headey 2011a). 
These omissions are sizable enough to suggest that the “global” trends reported in Tables 6.1 and 
6.2 could be influenced by the exclusion of these 16 countries. Hence in the last column of Table 7.1 we 
report upper-bound estimates of the possible rise in food insecurity among the 16. In the Middle East and 
North Africa we typically assume that food insecurity rose by around 10 percentage points, with a similar 
assumption for Sudan, the DRC, and Sierra Leone. In Ethiopia we assume a 20-point increase because of 
the country’s rapid food inflation and because its population is undoubtedly very vulnerable to food price 
increases. But in Malawi and Rwanda—where many poor people are smallholders—we make the more 
modest assumption of a 5-point increase (in any case these countries are much smaller than Ethiopia, 
Sudan, or the DRC), an assumption that also pertains to Peru and Paraguay. Finally, we assume that food 
insecurity rose by 14 points in the Philippines. Based on these upper-bound assumptions we find that 
these 16 countries could have added as many as 62 million to the ranks of the global numbers of self-
reported food insecure. This is a big enough number to influence the global estimates discussed above, 
although even if subtracted from the China–India sensitivity tests above, we would still find that global 
food insecurity rose under every assumption. 
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Table 7.1—Countries excluded from the “global” estimates and likely impacts of the 2007/08 food crisis on their food insecurity 
Country  Self-reported food insecurity data  Clues as to impact of global food crisis
a  Assumed 
impact
b  
  2005/06  2006/07  2007/08  2008/09  2009/10     
Seven Middle Eastern and North African countries; total population = 230 million 
Afghanistan    49  38  38   
All countries are dependent on wheat imports, and GIEWS data often 
show rising domestic wheat prices, while overall inflation was often high 
(exceptionally high in Yemen). In many instances self-reported food 
insecurity fell from 2008 to 2009, suggesting 2008 might have been a 
year of unusually high food insecurity. 
11 points 
Algeria      22  15  13  7 points 
Iraq      25  12  18  13 points 
Egypt      31  23  28  8 points 
Morocco  36  29        5 points 
Tunisia      22  11  9  11 points 
Yemen      47  48    10 points 
Three large African countries; total population = 190 million 
Ethiopia  24  38        In DRC and Sudan, GIEWS data suggest that many food items 
increased in price by 50–100%. In Ethiopia overall inflation peaked at 
60% in July 2008 but was already high before the global food crisis. 
20 points 
DRC      61      10 points 
Sudan    27    38  50  10 points 
Three medium-sized African countries; total population = 30 million 
Malawi  76  51    60    GIEWS data suggest rapid increases in maize, bean, and rice prices in 
Rwanda and Malawi, although many poor people produce maize and 
beans. Sierra Leone is a large importer of rice; inflation rose to 17% by 
mid-2008. 
5 points 
Rwanda  61      43    5 points 
Sierra Leone  58  63        10 points 
Two medium-sized Latin American countries; total population = 33 million 
Paraguay  40  36    31    In Paraguay there is no strong evidence on food inflation. In Peru, 
maize, potato, and wheat prices rose by 50%, but many poor people 
produce maize and potatoes.  
5 points 
Peru  50  45    46    5 points 
One large East Asian country; total population = 86 million 
Philippines  56  64    68  62  Rice prices rose by 50%, and food insecurity trend is upward.  14 points 
Total estimated change in self-reported food insecurity in all 16 countries  62.4 million 
people 
Source: Self-reported food insecurity data are from the Gallup World Poll (Gallup 2011). 
Notes: 
a. These clues include an assessment of FAO Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) data (FAO 2010), IMF inflation data (IMF 2011), and trends in the 
self-reported food insecurity reported in columns 2 through 6. 
b. This is the assumed change in self-reported food insecurity between 2005/06 and 2007/08. 
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Finally, we conduct a more systematic sensitivity test by disregarding the 2005/06 GWP results—
because of concerns that Gallup was still improving its survey design in this first round (see Section 3)—
and instead “predicting” the 2005/06 food insecurity levels based on trends in economic growth and food 
inflation from 2005/06 to 2007/08 and the coefficients estimated in Table 5.1. This backcasting approach 
is basically an instrumented variables (IV) approach, and like IV it may have the effect of reducing 
measurement error. Put another way, it will also “iron out” the influential outlying observations, such as 
those from China. A second advantage is that the country coverage becomes almost universal, including 
all the countries listed in Table 7.1 and rectifying other smaller omissions from the calculations of the 
previous section (the only sizable omission is Morocco). A final advantage is that we can decompose the 
predicted change in self-reported food insecurity into an economic growth component and a food inflation 
component, examining how each of these factors appears to have been driving global food insecurity 
trends. 
So what do we find? The basic result, shown in Table 7.2, is that 87.3 million people are still 
thrown out of self-reported food insecurity from 2005/06 to 2007/08. Note that in these IV results, self-
reported food insecurity falls by just under three percentage points in China and just under two percentage 
points in India. By decomposing the results into growth and inflation effects, one can conduct the kind of 
ceteris paribus experiments that simulation exercises pursue. For example, if food inflation changed as it 
did from 2005/06 to 2007/08 without any change in income—the experiment conducted in most LSMS-
based simulations—then food insecurity is indeed predicted to have risen by 128.2 million people. This is 
somewhere in between the 80 or so million predicted by the FAO and USDA, and the 160 million 
estimate derived by de Hoyos and Medvedev (2009), who also used food inflation in their experiment.
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However, the difference between our results and those others is that we find that the benefits of rapid 
economic growth easily outweighed the costs of food price inflation. Had economic growth followed its 
historical path with no increase in food prices, then 215 million people would be predicted to leave the 
ranks of the food insecure. 
Table 7.2—Estimating changes in self-reported food insecurity by backcasting and forecasting 
  2005/06 to 2007/08 
(2006/06 backcast from 2007/08) 
2007/08 to Dec. 2009 
(2009 forecast from 2007/08) 
Change in self-reported 
food insecurity  -87.3 million  +1.0 million 
Change due to 
economic growth  -215.4 million  +17.2 million 
Change due to food 
inflation  +128.2 million  -16.2 million 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Gallup World Poll (Gallup 2011). 
Notes: In the second column changes in self-reported food insecurity are estimated by backcasting 2005/06 food insecurity levels 
(June 2006) from 2007/08 levels by using regression results from Table 5.1, which model food insecurity changes as a function 
of economic growth and food inflation. For countries in which food inflation data are not available, overall inflation is used. For 
countries in which 2008 food insecurity data are not available, 2009 levels are used as the base. In the third column 2007/08 
results are combined with economic growth and food inflation trends to forecast self-reported food insecurity in December 2009, 
in roughly the middle of the financial crisis. 
Table 7.2 also finds an interesting result vis-à-vis the financial crisis. While economic growth 
slowed in 2009, the slowdown was very modest in many of the most populous countries, so our results do 
                                                       
23 Without China, we find that food inflation would have raised self-reported food insecurity by 90 million people. Since de 
Hoyos and Medvedev (2009) do not include China in their sample, this estimate of 90 million people is actually the more relevant 
comparison. There are other differences too. We measure the food price increase from June 2006 to June 2008, but de Hoyos and 
Medvedev measure it from January 2005 to December 2007 (although the magnitude of the change is very similar). More 
importantly, de Hoyos and Medvedev measure the impacts of food price changes relative to nonfood price changes, whereas our 
regressions use only nominal food price changes.  
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not estimate a large negative impact via this channel. On the other hand, food inflation slowed and in 
some cases was negative, thus mitigating the most severe impacts of the financial crisis on food 
insecurity. 
Let us summarize the results of this section. First, many of the sensitivity analyses employed 
above were purposively designed to reduce the magnitude of the food insecurity reduction in China. 
While it is difficult to assess which of the assumptions regarding Chinese trends is most plausible, all of 
the assumed reductions in the Chinese trends show that global self-reported food insecurity still fell by a 
large number from 2005/06 to 2007/08. Making some generous assumptions about the adversity of food 
insecurity trends in some omitted countries would reduce the scale of the global reduction in food 
insecurity still further, but again, the magnitude of that reduction is still considerable. Finally, using the 
regression results from Section 5 to backcast and forecast trends—in what is more or less an instrumental 
variables regression—still suggests that the numbers of self-reported food insecure in the developing 
world fell by around 87 million. So while various assumptions and techniques used in this section sizably 
reduce the admittedly improbable raw trends calculated in the previous section, the qualitative result 
remains the same: Self-reported food insecurity appears to have fallen from 2005/06 to 2007/08. Table 
7.3 summarizes these results. 
Table 7.3—Alternative estimates of global food insecurity trends 
Estimation scenarios 
Estimated change in global food 
insecurity, 2005/06 to 2007/08 
Raw results, 70 countries  -408 million 
Raw results, 70 countries, plus upper-bound assumptions for 16 omissions  -326 million 
Raw results, 68 countries, after excluding China and India  +9 million 
Raw results, 69 countries, after excluding China  -132 million 
Raw results, China and India trends adjusted by maximum margins of error  -250 million 
Raw results, food insecurity in China and India falls by 3 percentage points  -63 million 
As above plus upper-bound assumptions for 16 omitted countries  -1 million 
Predicted change after backcasting 2005/06 level, 88 countries  -87 million 
Source: Author’s calculations from Gallup World Poll data (Gallup 2011), FAO Global Information and Early Warning System 
(GIEWS) data (FAO 2010), and ILO food inflation data (ILO 2011). 
Note: See text in this section for more details regarding the assumptions and data.  
36 
8.  CAVEATS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has explored the usefulness of the Gallup World Poll indicators of self-reported food 
insecurity and hunger for assessing global food insecurity patterns and trends. In this concluding section 
we overview the strengths and weaknesses of these data, and summarize our main findings regarding 
trends in the two indicators of interest. To reiterate the main findings, our main result is that in 2007/08—
the food crisis period—there were fewer people reporting trouble affording food than in 2005/06. We are 
hesitant to say exactly how many, though two of our most conservative estimates suggest that global food 
insecurity fell by 60–90 million people, although these would be lower-bound estimates if the trends in 
China and India were somewhat stronger than a 2–3 percentage point reduction in food insecurity 
assumed or predicted in these scenarios. Certainly the fantastic growth rates and muted food inflation in 
these two countries could warrant a strong downward trend. Of course this conclusion does not mean that 
the global food crisis did not hurt. On the contrary, it hurt poor people in many countries, particularly in 
Africa. Yet our main finding is that the food crisis had a very limited impact in the most populous 
countries, thus casting into doubt existing estimates of global trends in food insecurity and hunger. 
This last point is particularly important because all existing simulation-based estimates of the 
impacts of the food crisis omit China, and many omit other large countries. Yet our results suggest that 
strong economic growth prevented the surge in international food prices from resulting in a genuine 
global crisis. Moreover, the fact that populous countries tend to be wary of heavily relying on 
international cereal markets—and the fact that many large countries also imposed export restrictions to 
protect domestic prices (Headey 2011a)—prevented them from experiencing significant food inflation. 
However, on this last point we add a note of caution. The events of 2005–2008 are not necessarily a good 
predictor of food price impacts in 2010/11. While countries like China and India are still growing rapidly, 
a notable difference in the current crisis (2010/11) is that some of these large countries are now 
experiencing quite rapid food inflation (although not yet rice price inflation). Hence the global impact of 
the current crisis could potentially be significantly worse than that of the 2007/08 crisis. 
Our results also suggest that the Gallup World Poll indicator of food affordability may be a good 
metric for assessing the impacts of price shocks in the future, although much more work needs to be done 
to further assess the reliability of this indicator. Existing work on subjective indicators has often found 
them to have low test–retest reliability or to be quite sensitive to the phrasing or placement of questions 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001; Krueger and Schkade 2008). Further appraisal of the GWP indicators 
would certainly be useful. We know very little about how people define food security across countries or 
socioeconomic groups, or how self-reported food insecurity varies within countries according to income 
or food consumption measures. Nevertheless, the fact that economic growth and food inflation explain 
trends in this indicator is encouraging, and it may be that further refinements to the survey question could 
be very useful. Moreover, a number of cross-country surveys ask self-reported food security questions, 
often with a more refined five-point scale. These include Gallup (for Africa and Asia only), but also 
Afrobarometer, the World Bank’s Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaires (CWIQs), and the World Food 
Programme’s comprehensive food security surveys. At the moment, however, there is no coordination, 
comparison, or systematic validation of these various surveys and indicators. Given the flaws of 
“objective” indicators of hunger and food insecurity, these institutions and others (such as FAO) should 
seriously consider scaling up and improving these indicators as a basis for improved measurement of this 
critical dimension of human welfare. 
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APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL STATISTICS AND ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 


























GWP hunger  1.00***                   
GWP food insecurity  0.90***  1.00***                 
GDP per capita (log)  -0.79***  -0.82***  1.00***               
Income per capita (log)  -0.67***  -0.61***  0.93***  1.00***             
FAO hunger  0.58***  0.49***  -0.59***  -0.61***  1.00***           
US$1/day poverty  0.77***  0.64***  -0.90***  -0.90***  0.60***  1.00***         
US$2/day poverty  0.68***  0.63***  -0.93***  -0.95***  0.69***  0.92***  1.00***       
Low BMI, women  -0.14  -0.18**  -0.57***  -0.65***  0.37**  0.56***  0.78***  1.00***     
Underweight children  0.55***  0.38***  -0.76***  -0.79***  0.46***  0.71***  0.76***  0.80***  1.00***   
Stunted children  0.48***  0.33***  -0.73***  -0.76***  0.45***  0.68***  0.72***  0.63***  0.90***  1.00*** 
Sources: Dependent variables (indicated by GWP) are from the Gallup World Poll (Gallup 2011). Independent variables are sourced as follows: GDP per capita is from World 
Bank (2010c) World Development Indicators. Poverty and income per capita are from household surveys collated in the World Bank Povcal data bank (2010b). FAO hunger is 
from Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 2011b). Low BMI, women, is from the Demographic Health Surveys (Measure DHS 2010), and underweight and stunted children 
are from the Demographic Health Surveys (Measure DHS 2010) and the World Health Organization (WHO 2010). 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All variables are measured in 2005 or the nearest available year. Log indicates that variable 
is expressed in logarithms to account for a nonlinear relationship. Samples vary in size because of the paucity of some of the poverty and malnutrition indicators.  
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Table A.2—Regressions of domestic food and overall inflation against international oil and food 
inflation 
Regression number  1  2  1  2 
Dependent domestic inflation variables  Overall CPI  Overall CPI  Food CPI  Food CPI 
Periods included  70  70  70  70 
Cross-sections included  135  135  131  131 
Observations  8,871  8,871  7,318  7,318 
No. of autoregressive terms included  8  8  8  8 
         
Effects of international oil inflation, lagged 1 month 
All income levels (interaction not significant)  0.0016***    -0.0040  0.0013 
Low income
a    0.0060***     
Middle income
a    0.0059***     
Upper income
a    0.0022**     
         
Effects of international food inflation, lagged 1 month 








Low income  0.0220***  0.0118***  0.0390***  0.0230*** 
Middle Income  0.0015***  0.0066***     
Upper income  0.0010***  0.0076***     
         
R-square  0.95  0.95  0.99  0.99 
Evidence that international inflation effects are 
different across income levels?
b 
Yes, but only 
for food 
Yes  No  No 
Evidence that low-income food price effects 
are at least twice as large as oil price effects?
c 
Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Source: Author’s estimates from International Monetary Fund data on overall consumer price index (CPI) inflation and oil price 
inflation (IMF 2011), International Labour Organization data on food inflation (ILO 2011), and Food and Agriculture 
Organization data on food and cereal prices (FAO 2011a). 
Notes: All inflation measures are the percent difference between the price level in month M and month M-12. International prices 
are converted into domestic currency units using IMF (2011) exchanges rates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The number of autoregressive terms was determined as part of a panel unit root test, which also 
determined that all variables are I(0). Also note that very similar results are obtained if domestic food inflation is used rather than 
overall inflation. 
a. Low income is defined as a 2005 GDP per capita of less than US$5,000 PPP, middle income as US$5,000–
13,000, and upper income as greater than US$13,000. 
b. This is based on the significance of interaction terms, which are not 
reported. c. This is based on Wald tests of the null hypothesis that food inflation coefficients are twice as large as their 
counterparts for oil inflation. The rationale for this is that international oil inflation over 2007–2008 was twice as high as 
international food inflation. Hence the test is designed to see whether the scales of oil and food inflation impacts are significantly 
different. 
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Table A.3—Descriptive statistics for staple food price index and food consumer price index (CPI) 
(percent changes) 
  Food CPI  Overall CPI  Staples index 
 Mean  11.4  8.9  11.5 
 Median  8.8  7.2  4.8 
 Maximum  49.3  35.6  90.1 
 Minimum  -19.1  -14.8  -75.4 
 Std. dev.  11.4  7.9  28.2 
 Correlation with food CPI  1.00  0.87  0.44 
 Observations  120  120  120 
Sources: The staples index is the weighted average of staples prices reported by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 
2010), where the weight for each item is based on its share of calorie intake. The Overall CPI is from the IMF (2011). The Food 
CPI is from the International Labour Organization (ILO 2011). 
Table A.4—Are changes in the GWP measures explained by economic growth and overall 
inflation? 
Regression no.  1  2  3  4 
Dependent variable
a  Change in food 
insecurity 
Percent change in 
food insecurity 




Number of countries  107  99  102  102 
Number of observations  259  228  181  181 
         
Constant  0.38  10.34***  -1.60**  -3.85 
Economic growth
b  -0.66***  -1.58***  -0.03  0.38 
 overall inflation
c  0.32***  0.68**  0.04  -0.25 
Growth*upper income
d   0.423**  -0.15  0.05  -0.79 
 inflation*upper income
d   -0.25**  -0.26  0.09  -0.36 
Growth*middle income
d   0.52**  1.11*
  0.08  -0.26 
 inflation*middle income
d   -0.09  -0.03  0.02  0.36 
         
R-square  0.14  0.11  0.02  0.01 
Adjusted R-square  0.12  0.09  -0.01  -0.02 
Growth effects in middle- and 
upper-income countries greater 
than zero? 
Yes for upper,  
no for lower 
Yes for upper,  
no for lower 
---  --- 
Low-income countries’ growth 
effects larger in absolute value 
than inflation effects? 
Yes  Yes  ---  --- 
Sources: Dependent variables are from the Gallup World Poll (Gallup 2011). Independent variables are sourced as follows: 
Economic growth from World Bank (2010c), overall inflation from International Monetary Fund (IMF 2011). 
Notes: These are ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively, and # indicates marginal insignificance at the 10% level. 
a. The dependent variable is the change in the GWP 
indicator between month M in year Y and the previous survey (Mt-1 and Yt-1). 
b. Economic growth is the percent change in GDP 
per capita between the two years in which the GWP surveys were conducted. 
c. Overall inflation is the percent change in the food 
CPI between the month of the GWP survey and the month of the previous GWP survey, where the CPI in any given month is 
actually the maximum CPI in the previous 12 months. This is because the GWP question asks about food affordability over the 
previous 12 months. 
d. Low income is defined as a 2005 GDP per capita of less than US$5,000 PPP, middle income as UA$5000–
13,000, and upper income as greater than US$13,000. Note that by this definition China is included as a low-income country.  
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Table A.5—Are changes in self-reported food insecurity and hunger explained by economic growth 
and inflation of staple food prices? 
Regression   1  2  3  4 
Dependent variable
a  Percent change 
in food inflation 
Change in food 
insecurity 
Percent change 
in food insecurity 
Change in 
hunger 
Number of countries  48  52  52  45 
Number of observations  123  127  127  68 
         
Constant  9.33***  1.72*  5.63**  -1.55 
Economic growth
b    -0.51***  -0.83*  0.18 
 staples inflation
c  0.18***  0.07**  0.18*  -0.03
# 
Growth*middle income
d     0.50**  1.10
#  -0.08 
staples inflation*middle income
d     -0.06  -0.19  0.07
# 
         
R-square  0.20  0.13  0.01  0.04 
Adjusted R-square  0.19  0.10    -0.02 
Sources: Dependent variables are from the Gallup World Poll (Gallup 2011). Independent variables are sourced as follows: 
Economic growth from World Bank (2010c), food inflation from ILO (2011), staples inflation from ILO (2011). 
Notes: These are ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively, and # indicates marginal insignificance at the 10% level. 
a. The dependent variable is the change between month M 
in year Y and the previous survey (Mt-1 and Yt-1). 
b. Economic growth is the percent change in GDP per capita between the two 
years in which the GWP surveys were conducted. 
c. Staples inflation is the percent change in an index of staple food prices 
between the month of the GWP survey and the month of the previous GWP survey, where the staple foods index in any given 
month is actually the maximum value in the previous 12 months. The staples index is the weighted average of reported staples, 
where the weight for each item is based on its share of calorie intake. 
d. Low income is defined as a 2005 GDP per capita of less 
than US$5,000 PPP and middle income as US$5,000–13,000. This sample does not contain upper-income countries because 
staple food prices are not available for them. 
Figure A.1—A scatter plot of changes in the two GWP indicators  
 
Source: Data are from the Gallup World Poll (Gallup 2011). 












APPENDIX B: RAW GALLUP DATA 










hunger  Income level 
AFG  Afghanistan  December 2008  49  Not available  low 
AFG  Afghanistan  October 2009  38  22  low 
AFG  Afghanistan  April 2010  38  33  low 
ALB  Albania  January 2006  23  Not available  middle 
ALB  Albania  September 2008  30  Not available  middle 
DZA  Algeria  June 2008  22  Not available  middle 
DZA  Algeria  September 2009  15  Not available  middle 
DZA  Algeria  March 2010  13  Not available  middle 
AGO  Angola  May 2006  63  Not available  low 
AGO  Angola  September 2008  79  57  low 
ARG  Argentina  May 2006  23  11  middle 
ARG  Argentina  August 2007  26  11  middle 
ARG  Argentina  August 2008  27  Not available  middle 
ARG  Argentina  August 2009  24  Not available  middle 
ARM  Armenia  July 2006  47  12  low 
ARM  Armenia  July 2007  26  4  low 
ARM  Armenia  August 2008  33  8  low 
ARM  Armenia  July 2009  47  Not available  low 
AUS  Australia  December 2005  8  Not available  upper 
AUS  Australia  April 2007  9  3  upper 
AUS  Australia  June 2008  11  4  upper 
AUS  Australia  March 2010  10  3  upper 
AUT  Austria  April 2006  3  Not available  upper 
AUT  Austria  April 2008  6  Not available  upper 
AZE  Azerbaijan  September 2006  37  11  low 
AZE  Azerbaijan  December 2007  57  16  low 
AZE  Azerbaijan  November 2008  60  15  low 
AZE  Azerbaijan  August 2009  60  Not available  low 
BHR  Bahrain  September 2009  22  Not available  upper 
BHR  Bahrain  April 2010  21  Not available  upper 
BGD  Bangladesh  May 2006  25  Not available  low 
BGD  Bangladesh  May 2007  24  18  low 
BGD  Bangladesh  June 2008  27  22  low 
BGD  Bangladesh  May 2009  23  17  low 
BGD  Bangladesh  April 2010  29  20  low 
BLR  Belarus  June 2006  22  4  middle 
BLR  Belarus  July 2007  22  4  middle 
BLR  Belarus  December 2008  24  4  middle 
BLR  Belarus  July 2009  28  Not available  middle 
BEL  Belgium  July 2005  7  1  upper 
BEL  Belgium  May 2007  6  1  upper 
BEL  Belgium  June 2008  7  1  upper 
BLZ  Belize  October 2007  Not available  22  middle 












hunger  Income level 
BEN  Benin  August 2008  64  63  low 
BOL  Bolivia  June 2006  41  28  low 
BOL  Bolivia  July 2007  39  24  low 
BOL  Bolivia  September 2008  42  Not available  low 
BOL  Bolivia  August 2009  36  Not available  low 
BIH  Bosnia-Herzegovina  January 2006  Not available  6  middle 
BIH  Bosnia-Herzegovina  September 2008  15  6  middle 
BIH  Bosnia-Herzegovina  September 2009  Not available  6  middle 
BWA  Botswana  May 2006  35  28  middle 
BWA  Botswana  July 2008  59  28  middle 
BRA  Brazil  November 2005  20  4  middle 
BRA  Brazil  August 2007  21  4  middle 
BRA  Brazil  October 2008  21  4  middle 
BRA  Brazil  September 2009  20  4  middle 
BGR  Bulgaria  January 2007  35  10  middle 
BGR  Bulgaria  March 2010  Not available  10  middle 
BFA  Burkina Faso  June 2006  52  52  low 
BFA  Burkina Faso  July 2007  42  40  low 
BFA  Burkina Faso  April 2008  56  Not available  low 
BFA  Burkina Faso  May 2010  66  Not available  low 
BDI  Burundi  July 2008  74  Not available  low 
BDI  Burundi  August 2009  67  Not available  low 
KHM  Cambodia  August 2006  67  20  low 
KHM  Cambodia  August 2007  58  34  low 
KHM  Cambodia  July 2008  53  35  low 
KHM  Cambodia  June 2009  55  12  low 
KHM  Cambodia  May 2010  49  15  low 
CMR  Cameroon  June 2006  66  65  low 
CMR  Cameroon  June 2007  57  59  low 
CMR  Cameroon  May 2008  66  Not available  low 
CMR  Cameroon  April 2009  73  Not available  low 
CMR  Cameroon  March 2010  75  Not available  low 
CAN  Canada  December 2005  7  2  upper 
CAN  Canada  September 2007  9  2  upper 
CAN  Canada  September 2008  7  2  upper 
CAN  Canada  August 2009  8  2  upper 
CAF  Central African Rep.  November 2007  75  79  low 
TCD  Chad  November 2006  72  76  low 
TCD  Chad  November 2007  54  59  low 
TCD  Chad  November 2008  54  Not available  low 
TCD  Chad  December 2009  56  Not available  low 
CHL  Chile  May 2006  27  17  middle 
CHL  Chile  August 2007  28  14  middle 
CHL  Chile  September 2008  33  Not available  middle 
CHL  Chile  September 2009  26  Not available  middle 












hunger  Income level 
CHN  China  November 2008  16  4  low 
CHN  China  September 2009  17  4  low 
COL  Colombia  June 2006  32  16  middle 
COL  Colombia  July 2007  36  13  middle 
COL  Colombia  August 2008  33  Not available  middle 
COL  Colombia  August 2009  37  Not available  middle 
COM  Comoros  March 2009  70  Not available  low 
COM  Comoros  March 2010  65  Not available  low 
COG  Congo, D. Rep.  September 2008  69  Not available  low 
CRI  Costa Rica  July 2006  26  7  middle 
CRI  Costa Rica  September 2007  27  10  middle 
CRI  Costa Rica  September 2008  24  Not available  middle 
CRI  Costa Rica  August 2009  23  Not available  middle 
CIV  Côte d’Ivoire  April 2009  53  Not available  low 
HRV  Croatia  January 2007  10  3  upper 
HRV  Croatia  September 2009  17  3  upper 
CYP  Cyprus  September 2006  7  4  upper 
CYP  Cyprus  May 2009  10  4  upper 
CZE  Czech Republic  July 2005  17  2  upper 
CZE  Czech Republic  June 2007  13  2  upper 
CZE  Czech Republic  January 2009  8  2  upper 
DNK  Denmark  July 2005  9  2  upper 
DNK  Denmark  May 2007  6  2  upper 
DNK  Denmark  April 2008  1  2  upper 
DNK  Denmark  December 2009  3  2  upper 
DJI  Djibouti  September 2008  44  Not available  low 
DJI  Djibouti  August 2009  24  Not available  low 
DOM  Dominican Republic  July 2006  48  36  middle 
DOM  Dominican Republic  September 2007  59  37  middle 
DOM  Dominican Republic  November 2008  59  Not available  middle 
DOM  Dominican Republic  September 2009  55  Not available  middle 
ECU  Ecuador  June 2006  36  26  middle 
ECU  Ecuador  July 2007  36  25  middle 
ECU  Ecuador  September 2008  46  Not available  middle 
ECU  Ecuador  September 2009  58  Not available  middle 
EGY  Egypt, Arab Rep.  September 2005  Not available  23  low 
EGY  Egypt, Arab Rep.  July 2007  Not available  23  low 
EGY  Egypt, Arab Rep.  May 2008  31  23  low 
EGY  Egypt, Arab Rep.  August 2009  23  23  low 
EGY  Egypt, Arab Rep.  March 2010  28  23  low 
SLV  El Salvador  June 2006  40  25  middle 
SLV  El Salvador  September 2007  47  22  middle 
SLV  El Salvador  September 2008  48  Not available  middle 
SLV  El Salvador  July 2009  44  Not available  middle 
EST  Estonia  July 2006  20  6  upper 












hunger  Income level 
EST  Estonia  July 2008  13  6  upper 
EST  Estonia  July 2009  22  Not available  upper 
ETH  Ethiopia  May 2006  24  22  low 
ETH  Ethiopia  July 2007  38  27  low 
FIN  Finland  April 2006  5  1  upper 
FIN  Finland  April 2008  7  1  upper 
FRA  France  July 2005  12  2  upper 
FRA  France  December 2006  10  2  upper 
FRA  France  June 2008  7  2  upper 
FRA  France  May 2009  9  2  upper 
GEO  Georgia  February 2006  52  18  low 
GEO  Georgia  May 2007  55  18  low 
GEO  Georgia  June 2008  51  17  low 
GEO  Georgia  May 2009  56  Not available  low 
DEU  Germany  July 2005  7  2  upper 
DEU  Germany  January 2007  7  2  upper 
DEU  Germany  October 2008  6  2  upper 
DEU  Germany  October 2009  6  2  upper 
GHA  Ghana  March 2006  44  39  low 
GHA  Ghana  February 2007  41  33  low 
GHA  Ghana  April 2008  41  Not available  low 
GHA  Ghana  July 2009  49  Not available  low 
GRC  Greece  July 2005  Not available  4  upper 
GRC  Greece  May 2007  9  4  upper 
GRC  Greece  October 2009  9  4  upper 
GTM  Guatemala  June 2006  26  21  low 
GTM  Guatemala  September 2007  21  11  low 
GTM  Guatemala  September 2008  25  Not available  low 
GTM  Guatemala  July 2009  27  Not available  low 
GUY  Guyana  October 2007  Not available  19  low 
HTI  Haiti  October 2006  63  73  low 
HTI  Haiti  December 2008  60  73  low 
HND  Honduras  June 2006  42  29  low 
HND  Honduras  September 2007  41  30  low 
HND  Honduras  September 2008  48  Not available  low 
HND  Honduras  July 2009  51  Not available  low 
HUN  Hungary  July 2005  20  4  upper 
HUN  Hungary  May 2007  15  4  upper 
HUN  Hungary  January 2009  Not available  4  upper 
IND  India  February 2006  35  Not available  low 
IND  India  May 2007  26  26  low 
IND  India  July 2008  22  15  low 
IND  India  November 2009  28  18  low 
IND  India  June 2010  27  19  low 
IDN  Indonesia  July 2006  28  Not available  low 












hunger  Income level 
IDN  Indonesia  March 2008  22  7  low 
IDN  Indonesia  May 2009  23  7  low 
IDN  Indonesia  April 2010  25  11  low 
IRQ  Iraq  June 2008  25  Not available  middle 
IRQ  Iraq  August 2009  12  Not available  middle 
IRQ  Iraq  February 2010  18  Not available  middle 
IRL  Ireland  May 2006  4  1  upper 
IRL  Ireland  April 2008  5  1  upper 
IRL  Ireland  April 2009  7  1  upper 
ISR  Israel  July 2006  14  5  upper 
ISR  Israel  August 2007  12  5  upper 
ISR  Israel  October 2008  14  5  upper 
ISR  Israel  November 2009  15  5  upper 
ITA  Italy  July 2005  11  3  upper 
ITA  Italy  May 2007  8  3  upper 
ITA  Italy  June 2008  16  3  upper 
ITA  Italy  May 2009  15  3  upper 
JAM  Jamaica  November 2006  Not available  23  middle 
JPN  Japan  November 2005  8  Not available  upper 
JPN  Japan  August 2007  6  2  upper 
JPN  Japan  March 2008  6  2  upper 
JPN  Japan  August 2009  7  Not available  upper 
JPN  Japan  June 2010  9  1  upper 
JOR  Jordan  September 2005  17  7  low 
JOR  Jordan  October 2007  9  7  low 
JOR  Jordan  August 2008  12  7  low 
JOR  Jordan  October 2009  9  7  low 
JOR  Jordan  April 2010  10  7  low 
KAZ  Kazakhstan  September 2006  25  8  middle 
KAZ  Kazakhstan  December 2007  28  7  middle 
KAZ  Kazakhstan  November 2008  26  4  middle 
KAZ  Kazakhstan  August 2009  26  Not available  middle 
KEN  Kenya  April 2006  71  56  low 
KEN  Kenya  June 2007  56  52  low 
KEN  Kenya  August 2008  67  Not available  low 
KEN  Kenya  April 2009  64  Not available  low 
KEN  Kenya  February 2010  57  Not available  low 
KOR  Korea, Rep.  March 2006  15  6  upper 
KOR  Korea, Rep.  May 2007  12  1  upper 
KOR  Korea, Rep.  September 2008  17  Not available  upper 
KOR  Korea, Rep.  September 2009  16  Not available  upper 
KWT  Kuwait  August 2006  6  7  upper 
KWT  Kuwait  August 2009  3  7  upper 
KWT  Kuwait  April 2010  9  7  upper 
KGZ  Kyrgyz Republic  March 2006  40  12  low 












hunger  Income level 
KGZ  Kyrgyz Republic  July 2008  34  8  low 
KGZ  Kyrgyz Republic  July 2009  32  Not available  low 
LAO  Lao PDR  July 2006  14  11  low 
LAO  Lao PDR  July 2007  21  15  low 
LAO  Lao PDR  August 2008  25  13  low 
LVA  Latvia  July 2006  16  6  upper 
LVA  Latvia  July 2007  18  4  upper 
LVA  Latvia  August 2008  14  4  upper 
LVA  Latvia  August 2009  23  Not available  upper 
LBN  Lebanon  September 2005  16  8  middle 
LBN  Lebanon  October 2006  16  8  middle 
LBN  Lebanon  May 2008  19  8  middle 
LBN  Lebanon  March 2009  20  8  middle 
LBN  Lebanon  March 2010  18  8  middle 
LBR  Liberia  February 2007  81  80  low 
LBR  Liberia  May 2008  78  80  low 
LBY  Libya  October 2009  14  Not available  middle 
LTU  Lithuania  July 2006  13  2  upper 
LTU  Lithuania  August 2007  10  4  upper 
LTU  Lithuania  June 2008  10  3  upper 
LTU  Lithuania  August 2009  16  Not available  upper 
MKD  Macedonia, FYR  September 2008  Not available  7  middle 
MKD  Macedonia, FYR  September 2009  Not available  7  middle 
MDG  Madagascar  July 2006  58  46  low 
MDG  Madagascar  August 2008  66  46  low 
MWI  Malawi  October 2006  76  76  low 
MWI  Malawi  June 2007  51  45  low 
MWI  Malawi  September 2009  60  Not available  low 
MYS  Malaysia  June 2007  9  3  middle 
MYS  Malaysia  September 2008  11  6  middle 
MYS  Malaysia  July 2009  20  6  middle 
MYS  Malaysia  June 2010  17  3  middle 
MLI  Mali  June 2006  60  55  low 
MLI  Mali  June 2008  29  55  low 
MLI  Mali  October 2009  40  55  low 
MRT  Mauritania  September 2006  39  34  low 
MRT  Mauritania  August 2007  39  26  low 
MRT  Mauritania  July 2008  39  Not available  low 
MRT  Mauritania  March 2009  40  Not available  low 
MRT  Mauritania  March 2010  43  Not available  low 
MEX  Mexico  November 2005  36  19  middle 
MEX  Mexico  July 2007  28  19  middle 
MEX  Mexico  August 2008  33  19  middle 
MEX  Mexico  August 2009  33  19  middle 
MDA  Moldova  April 2006  31  10  low 












hunger  Income level 
MDA  Moldova  October 2008  30  5  low 
MDA  Moldova  July 2009  34  Not available  low 
MNG  Mongolia  September 2007  34  12  low 
MNG  Mongolia  October 2008  36  13  low 
MON  Montenegro  January 2007  21  7  middle 
MON  Montenegro  September 2009  22  7  middle 
MAR  Morocco  August 2005  36  24  low 
MAR  Morocco  December 2007  29  24  low 
MAR  Morocco  August 2009  Not available  24  low 
MAR  Morocco  March 2010  Not available  24  low 
MOZ  Mozambique  May 2006  62  60  low 
MOZ  Mozambique  July 2007  46  43  low 
MOZ  Mozambique  June 2008  58  Not available  low 
NAM  Namibia  September 2007  Not available  35  low 
NPL  Nepal  June 2006  9  8  low 
NPL  Nepal  July 2007  13  13  low 
NPL  Nepal  October 2008  10  6  low 
NPL  Nepal  July 2009  17  9  low 
NPL  Nepal  May 2010  18  10  low 
NLD  Netherlands  July 2005  7  1  upper 
NLD  Netherlands  May 2007  4  1  upper 
NLD  Netherlands  June 2008  4  1  upper 
NZL  New Zealand  March 2006  11  4  upper 
NZL  New Zealand  February 2007  9  3  upper 
NZL  New Zealand  June 2008  13  3  upper 
NZL  New Zealand  March 2010  13  6  upper 
NIC  Nicaragua  June 2006  Not available  38  low 
NIC  Nicaragua  September 2007  51  35  low 
NIC  Nicaragua  September 2008  53  Not available  low 
NIC  Nicaragua  July 2009  49  Not available  low 
NER  Niger  June 2006  75  74  low 
NER  Niger  June 2008  68  Not available  low 
NER  Niger  June 2009  71  Not available  low 
NGA  Nigeria  May 2006  58  54  low 
NGA  Nigeria  May 2007  55  58  low 
NGA  Nigeria  April 2008  55  Not available  low 
NGA  Nigeria  August 2009  59  Not available  low 
NGA  Nigeria  April 2010  56  Not available  low 
NOR  Norway  May 2006  6  3  upper 
NOR  Norway  June 2008  5  3  upper 
PAK  Pakistan  September 2005  33  Not available  low 
PAK  Pakistan  June 2007  26  20  low 
PAK  Pakistan  June 2008  27  23  low 
PAK  Pakistan  May 2009  34  22  low 
PAK  Pakistan  May 2010  38  22  low 












hunger  Income level 
PAN  Panama  September 2007  36  13  middle 
PAN  Panama  August 2009  33  Not available  middle 
PRY  Paraguay  May 2006  40  20  low 
PRY  Paraguay  July 2007  36  12  low 
PRY  Paraguay  August 2009  31  Not available  low 
PER  Peru  June 2006  50  34  middle 
PER  Peru  July 2007  45  30  middle 
PER  Peru  August 2009  46  Not available  middle 
PHL  Philippines  March 2006  56  28  low 
PHL  Philippines  August 2007  64  33  low 
PHL  Philippines  June 2009  68  35  low 
PHL  Philippines  April 2010  62  33  low 
POL  Poland  July 2005  29  6  upper 
POL  Poland  May 2007  18  6  upper 
PRT  Portugal  September 2006  10  2  upper 
PRT  Portugal  January 2010  Not available  2  upper 
PRI  Puerto Rico  June 2006  Not available  6  upper 
QAT  Qatar  March 2009  8  Not available  upper 
ROM  Romania  July 2005  48  8  middle 
ROM  Romania  May 2007  33  8  middle 
ROM  Romania  April 2009  40  8  middle 
RWA  Rwanda  October 2006  61  61  low 
RWA  Rwanda  August 2009  43  61  low 
SAU  Saudi Arabia  September 2005  13  9  upper 
SAU  Saudi Arabia  March 2009  18  9  upper 
SEN  Senegal  May 2006  26  22  low 
SEN  Senegal  February 2007  22  21  low 
SEN  Senegal  June 2009  43  Not available  low 
SEN  Senegal  April 2010  49  Not available  low 
SER  Serbia  January 2007  17  5  middle 
SER  Serbia  September 2009  25  5  middle 
SLE  Sierra Leone  July 2006  58  67  low 
SLE  Sierra Leone  June 2007  63  67  low 
SGP  Singapore  March 2006  4  7  upper 
SGP  Singapore  May 2007  4  3  upper 
SGP  Singapore  February 2008  3  1  upper 
SGP  Singapore  June 2009  2  Not available  upper 
SGP  Singapore  June 2010  2  1  upper 
SVN  Slovenia  May 2009  11  1  upper 
ZAF  South Africa  March 2006  45  39  middle 
ZAF  South Africa  September 2007  48  46  middle 
ZAF  South Africa  September 2008  56  Not available  middle 
ZAF  South Africa  April 2009  55  Not available  middle 
ESP  Spain  July 2005  11  1  upper 
ESP  Spain  April 2007  9  1  upper 












hunger  Income level 
ESP  Spain  April 2009  14  1  upper 
LKA  Sri Lanka  March 2006  32  17  low 
LKA  Sri Lanka  May 2007  39  12  low 
LKA  Sri Lanka  May 2008  48  11  low 
LKA  Sri Lanka  June 2009  41  11  low 
LKA  Sri Lanka  May 2010  39  15  low 
SDN  Sudan  January 2008  27  24  low 
SDN  Sudan  March 2009  38  24  low 
SDN  Sudan  March 2010  50  24  low 
SWE  Sweden  July 2005  7  1  upper 
SWE  Sweden  April 2007  7  1  upper 
SWE  Sweden  April 2008  7  1  upper 
SWE  Sweden  December 2009  5  1  upper 
CHE  Switzerland  May 2006  6  1  upper 
CHE  Switzerland  December 2009  4  1  upper 
SYR  Syrian Arab Republic  August 2008  16  Not available  low 
SYR  Syrian Arab Republic  March 2009  16  Not available  low 
TJK  Tajikistan  June 2006  46  16  low 
TJK  Tajikistan  November 2007  41  9  low 
TJK  Tajikistan  November 2008  31  5  low 
TJK  Tajikistan  August 2009  36  Not available  low 
TZA  Tanzania  March 2006  53  41  low 
TZA  Tanzania  June 2007  39  35  low 
TZA  Tanzania  July 2008  62  Not available  low 
TZA  Tanzania  November 2009  60  Not available  low 
THA  Thailand  July 2006  10  9  middle 
THA  Thailand  August 2007  18  14  middle 
THA  Thailand  September 2008  18  9  middle 
THA  Thailand  November 2009  17  Not available  middle 
TGO  Togo  August 2006  62  54  low 
TGO  Togo  August 2008  67  54  low 
TTO  Trinidad and Tobago  November 2006  26  11  upper 
TTO  Trinidad and Tobago  October 2008  33  11  upper 
TUN  Tunisia  June 2008  22  Not available  middle 
TUN  Tunisia  August 2009  11  Not available  middle 
TUN  Tunisia  April 2010  9  Not available  middle 
TUR  Turkey  August 2005  Not available  11  middle 
TUR  Turkey  May 2007  26  11  middle 
TUR  Turkey  July 2008  47  11  middle 
TUR  Turkey  November 2009  37  11  middle 
UGA  Uganda  March 2006  62  56  low 
UGA  Uganda  June 2007  48  42  low 
UGA  Uganda  July 2008  62  Not available  low 
UGA  Uganda  June 2009  52  Not available  low 
UGA  Uganda  March 2010  59  Not available  low 












hunger  Income level 
UKR  Ukraine  July 2007  34  5  middle 
UKR  Ukraine  May 2008  27  5  middle 
UKR  Ukraine  May 2009  32  Not available  middle 
ARE  United Arab Emirates  August 2006  6  4  upper 
ARE  United Arab Emirates  September 2009  6  4  upper 
ARE  United Arab Emirates  April 2010  4  4  upper 
GBR  United Kingdom  June 2005  8  3  upper 
GBR  United Kingdom  January 2007  11  3  upper 
GBR  United Kingdom  June 2008  12  3  upper 
GBR  United Kingdom  May 2009  9  3  upper 
USA  United States  July 2006  17  3  upper 
USA  United States  August 2007  10  3  upper 
USA  United States  August 2008  9  3  upper 
USA  United States  July 2009  16  3  upper 
URY  Uruguay  June 2006  25  10  middle 
URY  Uruguay  July 2007  24  10  middle 
URY  Uruguay  September 2008  28  Not available  middle 
URY  Uruguay  August 2009  20  Not available  middle 
UZB  Uzbekistan  June 2006  37  11  low 
UZB  Uzbekistan  July 2008  39  8  low 
UZB  Uzbekistan  June 2009  38  Not available  low 
VEN  Venezuela  November 2005  41  13  middle 
VEN  Venezuela  December 2006  25  13  middle 
VEN  Venezuela  September 2008  26  13  middle 
VEN  Venezuela  August 2009  32  13  middle 
VNM  Vietnam  March 2006  27  17  low 
VNM  Vietnam  April 2008  17  6  low 
VNM  Vietnam  May 2009  25  6  low 
VNM  Vietnam  May 2010  25  7  low 
YEM  Yemen, Rep.  September 2009  47  Not available  low 
YEM  Yemen, Rep.  February 2010  48  Not available  low 
ZMB  Zambia  April 2006  58  53  low 
ZMB  Zambia  July 2007  65  67  low 
ZMB  Zambia  June 2008  67  Not available  low 
ZMB  Zambia  November 2009  69  Not available  low 
ZWE  Zimbabwe  April 2006  72  65  low 
ZWE  Zimbabwe  July 2007  71  50  low 
ZWE  Zimbabwe  March 2008  79  Not available  low 
ZWE  Zimbabwe  July 2009  73  Not available  low 
ZWE  Zimbabwe  March 2010  53  Not available  low 
Source: Gallup World Poll (Gallup 2011). 
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Table C.1—Gallup World Poll survey details including design effects and margins of error 











Interviewing  Languages  Exclusions or oversampling? 
Afghanistan   Jun 4–Jun 16, 
2009   1,000  1.66  4  Face-to-face   Dari, Pashto    
Afghanistan   Sep 20–Oct 12, 
2009   1,000  1.68  4  Face-to-face   Dari, Pashto    
Albania   Sep 7–Oct 2, 
2009   1,000  1.45  3.7  Face-to-face   Albanian     
Algeria   Feb 21–Mar 22, 
2009   1,000  1.27  3.5  Face-to-face   Arabic   Deep south excluded (25% of the 
population). 
Algeria   Aug 1–Sep 12, 
2009   1,000  1.24  3.5  Face-to-face   Arabic   Deep south excluded (25% of the 
population). 
Argentina   Jul 4–Aug 12, 
2009   1,000  1.36  3.6  Face-to-face   Spanish     
Armenia   Jun 10–Jul 7, 
2009   1,000  1.3  3.5  Face-to-face   Armenian, Russian     
Austria   Dec 4–Jan 28, 
2010   1,000  1.47  3.8  Telephone   German     
Azerbaijan   Jul 29–Aug 16, 
2009   1,000  1.32  3.6  Face-to-face   Azeri,  
Nagorno-Karabakh and 
territories excluded (10% of the 
population). 
Bahrain   Feb 23–Mar 19, 
2009   1,051  1.28  3.4  Face-to-face   Arabic   Non-Arabs excluded (25% of the 
population).  
Bahrain   Aug 17–Sep 15, 
2009   1,077  1.27  3.3  Face-to-face   Arabic   Non-Arabs excluded (25% of the 
population). 
Bangladesh   Apr 29–May 14, 
2009   1,000  1.22  3.4  Face-to-face   Bengali     
Belarus   Jun 3–Jul 10, 
2009   1,077  1.29  3.4  Face-to-face   Russian     
Bolivia   Jul 29–Aug 31, 
2009   1,000  1.47  3.8  Face-to-face   Spanish     
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  
Sep 8–Sep 30, 
2009   1,023  1.81  4.2  Face-to-face   Bosnian, Croatian, 
Serbian     
Brazil   Aug 11–Sep 1, 
2009   1,031  1.19  3.3  Face-to-face   Portuguese     
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Interviewing  Languages  Exclusions or oversampling? 
Bulgaria   Jan 25–Mar 2, 
2010   1,000  1.24  3.4  Face-to-face   Bulgarian     
Burundi   Jul 24–Aug 1, 
2009   1,000  1.31  3.5  Face-to-face   French, Kirundi     
Cambodia   Jun 4–Jun 27, 
2009   1,000  1.44  3.7  Face-to-face   Khmer     
Cameroon   Mar 24–Apr 7, 
2009   1,000  1.71  4.04  Face-to-face   French, English,     
Canada   Aug 7–Aug 25, 
2009   1,011  1.64  4  Face-to-face   English, French   Yukon, Northwest Territories, 
and Nunavut excluded. 
Chad   Nov 20–2–Dec–
09   1,000  1.92  4.3  Face-to-face   Chadian Arabic, 
French, Ngambaya  
Eastern part of country excluded 
(20% of the population). 
Oversampled educated 
population. 
Chile   Jul 3–Sep 8, 
2009   1,009  1.36  3.6  Face-to-face   Spanish     
China   Aug 14–Sep 28, 
2009   4,201  1.95  2.1  Face-to-face and 
telephone   Chinese    Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou 
oversampled.  
Colombia   Jul 14–Aug 1, 
2009   1,000  1.35  3.6  Face-to-face   Spanish     
Comoros   Feb 23–Mar 5, 
2009   1,000  1.44  3.7  Face-to-face   French, Comorian     
Comoros   Jul 15–Oct 10, 
2009   1,000  1.5  3.8  Face-to-face   French, Comorian     
Congo (DRC)   Nov 1–Nov 24, 
2009   1,000  1.62  3.9  Face-to-face   French, Lingala, 
Kiswahili  
North and South Kivu, Ituri, and 
Haut-Uele excluded (20% of the 
population). 
Costa Rica   Jul 6–Aug 8, 
2009   1,000  1.26  3.5  Face-to-face   Spanish     
Croatia   Sep 4–Sep 28, 
2009   1,009  1.07  3.2  Face-to-face   Croatian     
Cyprus   Apr 23–May 19, 
2009   502  1.46  5.3  Telephone   Greek     
Czech Republic   Dec 18–Jan 24, 
2009   1,077  1.19  3.3  Face-to-face   Czech     
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Interviewing  Languages  Exclusions or oversampling? 
Denmark   Dec 7–Dec 22, 
2009   1,000  1.48  3.8  Telephone   Danish     
Djibouti   Mar 2–Mar 12, 
2009   1,000  1.89  3.4  Face-to-face   French, Afar, Somali     
Djibouti   Jul 25–Aug 2, 
2009   1,000  1.25  3.5  Face-to-face   French, Afar, Somali     
Dominican Rep.   Jul 21–Sep 2, 
2009   1,000  1.37  3.6  Face-to-face   Spanish     
Ecuador   Jul 12–Sep 1, 
2009   1,000  1.31  3.6  Face-to-face   Spanish     
Egypt   Mar 7–Mar 22, 
2009   1,080  1.29  3.4  Face-to-face   Arabic     
Egypt   Aug 11–Aug 19, 
2009   1,032  1.28  3.5  Face-to-face   Arabic     
El Salvador   Jul 4–Jul 17, 
2009   1,006  1.14  3.3  Face-to-face   Spanish     
Estonia   Jun 13–Jul 7, 
2009   607  1.19  4.3  Face-to-face   Estonian, Russian     
France   Apr 16–May 18, 
2009   1,000  1.57  3.9  Telephone   French     
Georgia   May 2–May 13, 
2009   1,000  1.26  3.5  Face-to-face   Georgian, Russian, 
Armenian  
South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
excluded (7% of the population). 
Germany   Sep 28–Oct 18, 
2009   1,000  1.27  3.5  Telephone   German     
Ghana   Jul 9–Jul 31, 
2009   1,000  1.52  3.8  Face-to-face   English, Hausa, Ewe, 
Twi, Dagbani     
Greece   Oct 1–Oct 15, 
2009   1,000  1.44  3.7  Face-to-face   Greek     
Guatemala   Jul 8–Jul 21, 
2009   1,015  1.18  3.3  Face-to-face   Spanish     
Honduras   Jul 11– Jul 25, 
2009   1,002  1.17  3.3  Face-to-face   Spanish     
Hong Kong   Nov 23–Dec 16, 
2009   755  1.48  4.3  Telephone   Chinese     
India   May 1 – Jun 17, 
2010   6,000  1.72  1.66  Face-to-face   11 national languages   Northeast states and remote islands 
excluded (<10% of the population). 
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India   Oct 1–Nov 30, 
2009   3,010  2.07  2.6  Face-to-face   11 national languages  Northeast states and remote islands 
excluded (<10% of the population). 
Indonesia   Apr 18–May 5, 
2009   1,080  1.41  3.5  Face-to-face   Bahasa Indonesia     
Indonesia   Apr 4–Apr 24, 
2010   1,080  1.36  3.5  Face-to-face   Bahasa Indonesia     
Iraq   Feb 20–Mar 12, 
2009   1,000  1.43  3.7  Face-to-face   Arabic     
Iraq   Aug 10–Aug 20, 
2009   1,000  1.41  3.6  Face-to-face   Arabic, Kurdish     
Iraq   Feb 17–Feb 27, 
2010   1,000  1.33  3.6  Face-to-face   Arabic, Kurdish     
Ireland   Apr 17–Apr 27, 
2009   500  1.55  5.5  Telephone   English     
Israel   Oct 11–Nov 5, 
2009   1,000  1.27  3.5  Face-to-face   Arabic, Hebrew     
Italy   Apr 21–May 6, 
2009   1,005  1.71  4  Telephone   Italian     
Ivory Coast   Apr 4–Apr 15, 
2009   1,000  1.26  3.5  Face-to-face   Dioula, French     
Japan   Jul 31–Aug 31, 
2009   1,000  1.7  4  Telephone   Japanese     
Japan   June 5 – Jun 
24, 2010   1,000  1.37  3.6  Telephone   Japanese     
Jordan   Mar 18–Apr 2, 
2009   1,015  1.19  3.4  Face-to-face   Arabic     
Jordan   Sep 23–Oct 10, 
2009   1,001  1.23  3.4  Face-to-face   Arabic     
Jordan   Mar 20–Apr 9, 
2010   1,000  1.29  3.5  Face-to-face   Arabic     
Kazakhstan   Jul 2–Aug 6, 
2009   1,000  1.3  3.5  Face-to-face   Kazakh, Russian     
Kenya   Feb 5–Feb 17, 
2010   1,000  1.51  3.8  Face-to-face   English, Kishwahili     
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Kenya   Mar 30–Apr 10, 
2009   1,000  1.42  3.7  Face-to-face   English, Kiswahili     
Kosovo   Sep 8–Sep 24, 
2009   1,000  1.82  4.2  Face-to-face   Albanian, Serbian, 
Montenegrin     
Kuwait   Feb 23–Mar 18, 
2009   1,000  1.23  3.4  Face-to-face   Arabic   Non-Arabs excluded (20% of the 
population). 
Kuwait   Aug 10–Aug 30, 
2009   1,000  1.15  3.3  Face-to-face   Arabic   Non-Arabs excluded (20% of the 
population). 
Kuwait   Apr 8–Apr 17, 
2010   1,000  1.25  3.5  Face-to-face   Arabic   Non-Arabs excluded (20% of the 
population). 
Kyrgyzstan   Jun 13–Jul 10, 
2009   1,000  1.55  3.9  Face-to-face   Kyrgyz, Russian, 
Uzbek     
Latvia   Aug 15–Aug 24, 
2009   515  1.19  4.7  Face-to-face   Latvian, Russian     
Lebanon   Feb 18–Mar 20, 
2009   1,002  1.23  3.4  Face-to-face   Arabic     
Lebanon   Aug 2–Aug 30, 
2009   1,008  1.28  3.5  Face-to-face   Arabic     
Lebanon   Feb 3–Mar 25, 
2010   1,008  1.61  3.9  Face-to-face   Arabic     
Libya   Aug 17–Oct 19, 
2009   1,000  1.59  3.9  Face-to-face   Arabic, English  
Sample includes only Tripoli, 
Benghazi, and Al Kufra (50% of 
population). Sample skews male 
and employed.  
Libya   Feb 20–Mar 18, 
2010   1,000  1.18  3.4  Face-to-face   Arabic  
Sample includes only Tripoli, 
Benghazi, and Al Kufra (50% of 
population). Sample skews male 
and employed. 
Lithuania   Jul 24–Aug 10, 
2009   500  1.46  5.3  Face-to-face   Lithuanian     
Macedonia   Sep 10–Sep 22, 
2009   1,008  1.34  3.6  Face-to-face   Albanian, Bosnian, 
Macedonian     
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Malawi   Sep 5–Sep 17, 
2009   1,000  1.47  3.8  Face-to-face   Chichewa, English, 
Tumbuka     
Malaysia   Jun 12–Jul 26, 
2009   1,011  2.04  4.4  Face-to-face   Bahasa Malay, 
Chinese, English     
Malaysia   May 15 – 
Jun17, 2010   1000  1.34  3.6  Face-to-face   Bahasa Malay, 
Chinese, English     
Mali   Oct 15–Oct 30, 
2009   1,000  1.31  3.6  Face-to-face   Bambara, French     
Mauritania   Feb 20–Mar 1, 





Mauritania   Jul 25–Sep 26, 





Mauritania   Feb 28–Mar 11, 




Tiris and Adrar excluded (5% of 
the population). 
Mexico   Jul 21–Aug 5, 
2009   1,000  1.35  3.6  Face-to-face   Spanish     
Moldova   Jun 12–Jul 4, 
2009   1,000  1.34  3.3  Face-to-face   Romanian/ Moldovan, 
Russian  
Transnistria (Prednestrovie) 
excluded (13% of the 
population). 
Montenegro   Sep 6–Sep 21, 
2009   1,003  2.1  4.5  Face-to-face   Albanian, Bosnian, 
Montenegrin, Serbian     
Morocco   Feb 26–Mar 18, 
2009   1,000  1.21  3.4  Face-to-face   Arabic, French     
Morocco   Aug 7–Aug 24, 
2009   1,031  1.41  3.6  Face-to-face   Arabic, French     
Morocco   Feb 18–Mar 23, 
2010   1,002  1.26  3.5  Face-to-face   Arabic and French     
Nepal   Apr 4–May 4, 
2010   1,000  1.65  4  Face-to-face   Nepali     
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Nepal   Jun 19–Jul 25, 
2009   1,002  1.37  3.6  Face-to-face   Nepali     
New Zealand   Feb 11–Mar 10, 
2010   750  1.38  4.2  Telephone   English     
Nicaragua   Jul 4–Jul 23, 
2009   1,012  1.16  3.3  Face-to-face   Spanish     
Niger   Jun 19–Jun 28, 
2009   1,000  1.29  3.5  Face-to-face   French, Zarma, 
Haussa  
Agadez region excluded (5% of 
the population). 
Nigeria   Jul 15–Aug 6, 
2009   1,000  1.35  3.6  Face-to-face   English, Yoruba, 
Hausa, Igbo     
Nigeria   Mar 19–Apr 4, 
2010   1,000  1.32  3.5  Face-to-face   (Pidgin) English, 
Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba    
Pakistan   May 5 – May 
25, 2010   1,030  1.51  3.7  Face-to-face   Urdu   FATA/FANA excluded (5% of the 
population). 
Pakistan   May 1–May 17, 
2009   842  1.41  4  Face-to-face   Urdu   FATA/FANA excluded (5% of the 
population). Urban oversampled. 
Pakistan   May 1–Jun 30, 
2009   1,133  1.57  3.7  Face-to-face   Urdu   FATA/FANA excluded (5% of the 
population). 
Pakistan   Nov 14–Dec 7, 
2009   1,147  1.56  3.6  Face-to-face   Urdu   FATA/FANA excluded (5% of the 
population). 
Palestine   Feb 13–Feb 23, 
2009   1,014  1.44  3.7  Face-to-face   Arabic    
Palestine   Aug 3–Aug 17, 
2009   1,000  1.42  3.7  Face-to-face   Arabic    
Palestine   Feb 4–Feb 20, 
2010   1,000  1.5  3.8  Face-to-face   Arabic    
Panama   Jul 9–Aug 3, 
2009   1,018  1.19  3.4  Face-to-face   Spanish     
Paraguay   Jul 6–Aug 26, 
2009   1,000  1.33  3.6  Face-to-face   Spanish     
Peru   Jul 25–Aug 17, 
2009   1,000  1.59  3.9  Face-to-face   Spanish     
Philippines   Apr 9–Apr 15, 
2010   1,000  1.41  3.7  Face-to-face   7 national languages     
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Philippines   Jun 4–Jun 10, 
2009   1,000  1.6  3.9  Face-to-face   7 national languages    
Poland   Dec 12, 2009–
Jan 16, 2010   1,000  1.3  3.5  Face-to-face   Polish     
Portugal   Dec 5, 2009–
Jan 5, 2010   1,000  1.39  3.7  Telephone   Portuguese     
Qatar   Mar 11–Mar 25, 
2009   1,016  1.44  3.69  Face-to-face   Arabic   Non-Arabs excluded (50% of the 
population)  
Romania   Mar 3–Apr 5, 
2009   1,000  1.46  3.75  Face-to-face   Romanian     
Russia   Apr 2–Jun 14, 
2009   2,042  1.65  2.8  Face-to-face   Russian   Urban oversampled. 
Russia   April 29 – Jun 
16, 2010   2,000  1.62  2.8  Face-to-face   Russian     
Rwanda   Aug 10–Aug 18, 
2009   1,000  1.55  3.9  Face-to-face   French, 
Kinyarwandan     
Saudi Arabia   Feb 17–Mar 20, 
2009   1,031  1.23  3.39  Face-to-face   Arabic   Non-Arabs excluded (20% of the 
population). 
Saudi Arabia   Aug 1–Aug 21, 
2009   1,021  1.41  3.6  Face-to-face   Arabic   Non-Arabs excluded (20% of the 
population). 
Senegal   Apr 5–Apr 15, 
2010   1,000  1.66  4  Face-to-face   French, Wolof    
Senegal   May 23–Jun 1, 
2009   1,000  2.42  4.8  Face-to-face   French, Wolof    
Serbia   Sep 4–Sep 17, 
2009   1,008  1.24  3.4  Face-to-face   Montenegrin, Serbian     
Singapore   May 15 – Jun 9, 
2010   1,001  1.42  3.7  Face-to-face   Chinese, English     
Singapore   May 30–Jun 18, 
2009   1,005  1.41  3.7  Face-to-face   Chinese, English, 
Bahasa Malay     
Slovenia   Apr 16–May 5, 
2009   500  1.67  5.7  Telephone   Slovene     
Somaliland   Mar 6–Mar 17, 
2009   1,000  1.21  3.4  Face-to-face   Arabic, Somali, Afar     
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Somaliland   Aug 1–Aug 11, 
2009   1,000  1.24  3.4  Face-to-face   Arabic, Somali, Afar     
Somaliland   Feb 27–Mar 11, 
2010   1,000  1.24  3.4  Face-to-face   Somali     
South Africa   Mar 21–Apr 7, 
2009   1,000  1.68  4  Face-to-face   Afrikaans, English, 
Sotho, Zulu, Xhosa     
South Korea   Sep 2–Sep 27, 
2009   1,000  1.29  3.5  Landline   Korean     
Spain   Apr 14–Apr 24, 
2009   1,005  1.64  4  Telephone   Spanish     
Sri Lanka   April 24 – May 
21, 2010   1030  1.68  4  Face-to-face   Sinhalese, Tamil     
Sri Lanka   May 16–Jun 8, 
2009   1,000  1.73  4.1  Face-to-face   Sinhalese, Tamil  
Northern and Eastern parts of Sri 
Lanka excluded (10% of the 
population). 
Sudan   Mar 2–Mar 12, 
2009   1,000  1.89  4.2  Face-to-face   Arabic, English  
Southern and southwestern 
parts, including Darfur excluded 
(25% of the population). 
Sudan   Jul 29–Aug 9, 
2009   1,000  1.74  4.1  Face-to-face   Arabic, English  
Southern and southwestern 
parts, including Darfur excluded 
(25% of the population). 
Sudan   Feb 19–Mar 4, 
2010   1,000  1.74  4.1  Face-to-face   Arabic, English   Darfur excluded (15% of the 
population). 
Sweden   Dec 3–Dec 20, 
2009   1,002  1.41  3.7  Telephone   Swedish     
Switzerland   Dec 2–Dec 18, 
2009   1,003  1.29  3.5  Telephone   French, German, 
Italian     
Syria   Feb 20–Mar 16, 
2009   1,082  1.29  3.4  Face-to-face   Arabic     
Syria   Aug 10–Sep 30, 
2009   1,018  1.29  3.4  Face-to-face   Arabic     
Syria   Mar 3–Apr 30, 
2010   1,029  1.27  3.4  Face-to-face   Arabic     
 
    
  61 
Table C.1—Continued 









Interviewing  Languages  Exclusions or oversampling? 
Tajikistan   Jul 27–Aug 14, 
2009   1,000  1.44  3.7  Face-to-face   Russian, Tajik     
Tanzania   Nov 2–Nov 14, 
2009   1,000  1.83  4.2  Face-to-face   English, Kishwahili     
Thailand   Oct 1–Nov 1, 
2009   1,019  1.5  3.8  Face-to-face   Thai     
Tunisia   Feb 20–Mar 25, 
2009   1,008  1.11  3.3  Face-to-face   Arabic     
Tunisia   Aug 2–Aug 22, 
2009   1,006  1.15  3.3  Face-to-face   Arabic     
Tunisia   Feb 3–Apr 27, 
2010   1,059  1.35  3.5  Face-to-face   Arabic     
Turkey   Oct 24–Nov 17, 
2009   999  1.47  3.8  Face-to-face   Turkish     
Turkmenistan   Jul 1–Aug 9, 
2009   1,000  1.2  3.4  Face-to-face   Turkmen, Russian     
Uganda   Mar 19–Mar 30, 
2010   1,000  1.45  3.7  Face-to-face   Ateso, English, 
Luganda, Runyankole  
Northern region excluded (10% 
of the population). Educated 
population oversampled. 
Uganda   May 23–Jun 3, 
2009   1,000  1.58  3.9  Face-to-face   English, Luganda, 
Ateso, Runyankole  
Northern region excluded (10% 
of the population). Educated 
population oversampled. 
Ukraine   May 11–May 
25, 2009   1,081  1.73  3.9  Telephone   Russian, Ukrainian   Urban oversampled. 
UAE   Mar 1–Mar 31, 
2009   1,013  1.35  3.5  Face-to-face   Arabic   Non-Arabs excluded (50% of the 
population). 
UAE   Aug 8–Sep 18, 
2009   1,041  1.34  3.5  Face-to-face   Arabic   Non-Arabs excluded (50% of the 
population). 
UAE   Feb 21–Apr 20, 
2010   1,037  1.35  3.5  Face-to-face   Arabic   Non-Arabs excluded (50% of the 
population). 
UK   Apr 17–May 6, 
2009   1,002  1.45  3.7  Telephone   English     
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United States   May 5–Jul 8, 
2009   1,003  1.48  3.8  Telephone   English     
Uruguay   Aug 1–Aug 30, 
2009   1,000  1.29  3.5  Face-to-face   Spanish     
Uzbekistan   May 20–Jun 8, 
2009   1,000  1.34  3.6  Face-to-face   Russian, Uzbek     
Venezuela   Jul 22–Aug 12, 
2009   1,000  1.69  4  Face-to-face   Spanish     
Vietnam   Apr 11–May 26, 
2009   1,009  1.6  3.9  Face-to-face   Vietnamese     
Vietnam   Apr 6–May 11, 
2010   1,000  1.35  3.6  Face-to-face   Vietnamese     
Yemen   Feb 24–Mar 19, 
2009   1,000  1.51  3.8  Face-to-face   Arabic  
Gender-matched sampling used 
during the final stage of 
selection.  
Yemen   Aug 4–Sept 2, 
2009   1,000  1.43  3.7  Face-to-face   Arabic  
Gender-matched sampling used 
during the final stage of 
selection.  
Yemen   Feb 12–Feb 27, 
2010   1,000  1.57  3.9  Face-to-face   Arabic     
Zambia   Nov 8–Nov 19, 
2009   1,000  1.75  4.1  Face-to-face   Bemba, English, Lozi, 
Nyanja, Tonga  
Educated population 
oversampled.  
Zimbabwe   Mar 12–Mar 25, 
2010   1,000  1.19  3.38  Face-to-face   English, Ndebele, 
Shona     
Source: Gallup (2010a). 
Notes: 
a The design effect calculation reflects the weights and does not incorporate the intraclass correlation coefficients. Design effect calculation: n*(sum of squared 
weights)/[(sum of weights)*(sum of weights)]. 
b. Margin of error is calculated around a proportion at the 95% confidence level. The maximum margin of error was calculated 
assuming a reported percentage of 50% and takes into account the design effect. Margin of error calculation: (0.25/N)^0.5*1.96*(DE)^0.5.    
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